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Abstract
Differential privacy is a framework to quantify to what extent individual privacy in a statistical database is preserved while
releasing useful aggregate information about the database. In this work we study the fundamental tradeoff between privacy and
utility in differential privacy. We derive the optimal -differentially private mechanism for single real-valued query function under
a very general utility-maximization (or cost-minimization) framework. The class of noise probability distributions in the optimal
mechanism has staircase-shaped probability density functions which are symmetric (around the origin), monotonically decreasing
and geometrically decaying. The staircase mechanism can be viewed as a geometric mixture of uniform probability distributions,
providing a simple algorithmic description for the mechanism. Furthermore, the staircase mechanism naturally generalizes to
discrete query output settings as well as more abstract settings. We explicitly derive the parameter of the optimal staircase
mechanism for `1 and `2 cost functions. Comparing the optimal performances with those of the usual Laplacian mechanism,
we show that in the high privacy regime ( is small), the Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal as  → 0; in the low
privacy regime ( is large), the minimum magnitude and second moment of noise are Θ(∆e−

2 ) and Θ(∆2e−
2
3 ) as → +∞,
respectively, while the corresponding figures when using the Laplacian mechanism are ∆

and 2∆
2
2
, where ∆ is the sensitivity
of the query function. We conclude that the gains of the staircase mechanism are more pronounced in the moderate-low privacy
regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy is a formal framework to quantify to what extent individual privacy in a statistical database is preserved
while releasing useful aggregate information about the database. It provides strong privacy guarantees by requiring the
indistinguishability of whether an individual is in the dataset or not based on the released information. The key idea of
differential privacy is that the presence or absence of any individual data in the database should not affect the final released
statistical information significantly, and thus it can give strong privacy guarantees against an adversary with arbitrary auxiliary
information. For motivation and background of differential privacy, we refer the readers to the survey [1] by Dwork.
Since its introduction in [2] by Dwork et. al., differential privacy has spawned a large body of research in differentially private
data-releasing mechanism design and performance analysis in various settings. Differential privacy is a privacy-preserving
constraint imposed on the query output releasing mechanisms, and to make use of the released information, it is important to
understand the fundamental tradeoff between utility(accuracy) and privacy.
In many existing works on studying the tradeoff between accuracy and privacy in differential privacy, the usual metric of
accuracy is in terms of the variance, or magnitude expectation of the noise added to the query output. For example, Hardt and
Talwar [3] study the tradeoff between privacy and error for answering a set of linear queries over a histogram in a differentially
private way, where the error is defined as the worst expectation of the `2-norm of the noise among all possible query output.
[3] derives lower and upper bounds on the error given the differential privacy constraint. Nikolov, Talwar and Zhang [4] extend
the result on the tradeoff between privacy and error to the case of (, δ)-differential privacy. Li et. al. [5] study how to optimize
linear counting queries under differential privacy, where the error is measured by the mean squared error of query output
estimates, which corresponds to the variance of the noise added to the query output to preserve differential privacy.
More generally, the error can be a general function depending on the additive noise (distortion) to the query output. Ghosh,
Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [6] study a very general utility-maximization framework for a single count query with sensitivity
one under differential privacy, where the utility (cost) function can be a general function depending on the noise added to the
query output. [6] shows that there exists a universally optimal mechanism (adding geometric noise) to preserve differential
privacy for a general class of utility functions under a Bayesian framework. Brenner and Nissim [7] show that for general
query functions, no universally optimal differential privacy mechanisms exist. Gupte and Sundararajan [8] generalize the result
of [6] to a minimax setting.
In this work, we study the fundamental tradeoff between utility and privacy under differential privacy, and derive the optimal
differentially private mechanism for general single real-valued query function, where the utility model is the same as the
one adopted in [6] and [8], and the real-valued query function can have arbitrary sensitivity. Our results can be viewed as a
generalization of [6] and [8] to general real-valued query functions with arbitrary sensitivity. We discuss the relations of our
work and the existing works in detail in Section I-D.
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2A. Background on Differential Privacy
The basic problem setting in differential privacy for statistical database is as follows: suppose a dataset curator is in charge
of a statistical database which consists of records of many individuals, and an analyst sends a query request to the curator
to get some aggregate information about the whole database. Without any privacy concerns, the database curator can simply
apply the query function to the dataset, compute the query output, and send the result to the analyst. However, to protect the
privacy of individual data in the dataset, the dataset curator should use a randomized query-answering mechanism such that
the probability distribution of the query output does not differ too much whether any individual record is in the database or
not.
Formally, consider a real-valued query function
q : Dn → R, (1)
where Dn is the set of all possible datasets. The real-valued query function q will be applied to a dataset, and query output
is a real number. Two datasets D1, D2 ∈ Dn are called neighboring datasets if they differ in at most one element, i.e., one
is a proper subset of the other and the larger dataset contains just one additional element [1]. A randomized query-answering
mechanism K for the query function q will randomly output a number with probability distribution depends on query output
q(D), where D is the dataset.
Definition 1 (-differential privacy [1]). A randomized mechanism K gives -differential privacy if for all data sets D1 and
D2 differing on at most one element, and all S ⊂ Range(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D2) ∈ S], (2)
where K(D) is the random output of the mechanism K when the query function q is applied to the dataset D.
The differential privacy constraint (2) essentially requires that for all neighboring datasets, the probability distributions of
the output of the randomized mechanism should be approximately the same. Therefore, for any individual record, its presence
or absence in the dataset will not significantly affect the output of the mechanism, which makes it hard for adversaries with
arbitrary background knowledge to make inference on any individual from the released query output information. The parameter
 ∈ (0,+∞) quantifies how private the mechanism is: the smaller  is , the more private the randomized mechanism is.
1) Operational Meaning of -Differential Privacy in the Context of Hypothesis Testing: As shown by [9], one can interpret
the differential privacy constraint (2) in the context of hypothesis testing in terms of false alarm probability and missing
detection probability. Indeed, consider a binary hypothesis testing problem over two neighboring datasets, H0 : D1 versus
H1 : D2, where an individual’s record is in D2 only. Given a decision rule, let S be the decision region such that when the
released output lies in S, H1 will be rejected, and when the released output lies in SC (the complement of S), H0 will be
rejected. The false alarm probability PFA and the missing detection probability PMD can be written as
PFA = P (K(D1) ∈ SC), (3)
PMD = P (K(D2) ∈ S). (4)
Therefore, from (2) we get
1− PFA ≤ ePMD. (5)
Thus
ePMD + PFA ≥ 1. (6)
Switch D1 and D2 in (2), and we get
Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D1) ∈ S]. (7)
Therefore,
1− PMD ≤ ePFA, (8)
and thus
PMD + e
PFA ≥ 1. (9)
In conclusion, we have
ePMD + PFA ≥ 1, (10)
PMD + e
PFA ≥ 1. (11)
The -differential privacy constraint implies that in the context of hypothesis testing, PFA and PMD can not be both too
small.
32) Laplacian Mechanism: The standard approach to preserving -differential privacy is to perturb the query output by adding
random noise with Laplacian distribution proportional to the sensitivity ∆ of the query function q, where the sensitivity of a
real-valued query function is defined as
Definition 2 (Query Sensitivity [1]). For a real-valued query function q : Dn → R, the sensitivity of q is defined as
∆ := max
D1,D2∈Dn
|q(D1)− q(D2)|, (12)
for all D1, D2 differing in at most one element.
Formally, the Laplacian mechanism is:
Definition 3 (Laplacian Mechanism [2]). For a real-valued query function q : Dn → R with sensitivity ∆, Laplacian mechanism
will output
K(D) := q(D) + Lap(
∆

), (13)
where Lap(λ) is a random variable with probability density function
f(x) =
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ , ∀x ∈ R. (14)
Consider two neighboring datasets D1 and D2 where |q(D1)− q(D2)| = ∆. It is easy to compute the tradeoff between the
false alarm probability PFA and the missing detection probability PMD under Laplacian mechanism, which is
PMD =

1− ePFA PFA ∈ [0, 12e−)
e−
4PFA
PFA ∈ [ 12e−, 12 )
e−(1− PFA) PFA ∈ [ 12 , 1]
(15)
Since its introduction in [2], the Laplacian mechanism has become the standard tool in differential privacy and has been
used as the basic building block in a number of works on differential privacy analysis in other more complex problem settings,
e.g., [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [5], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30],
[31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46]. Given this near-routine use of the
query-output independent adding of Laplacian noise, the following two questions are natural:
• Is query-output independent perturbation optimal?
• Assume query-output independent perturbation, is Lapacian noise distribution optimal?
In this work we answer the above two questions. Our main result is that given an -differential privacy constraint, under a
general utility-maximization (equivalently, cost-minimization) model:
• adding query-output independent noise is indeed optimal (under a mild technical condition),
• the optimal noise distribution is not Laplacian distribution; instead, the optimal one has a staircase-shaped probability
density function.
These results are derived under the following settings:
• when the domain of the query output is the entire real line or the set of integers;
• nothing more about the query function is known beyond its global sensitivity;
• either local sensitivity [47] of the query function is unknown or it is the same as global sensitivity (as in the important
case of count queries).
If any of these conditions are violated (the output domain has sharp boundaries, or the local sensitivity deviates from the global
sensitivity [47], or we are restricted to specific query functions [21]), then the optimal privacy mechanism need not be data or
query output dependent.
B. Problem Formulation
We formulate a utility-maximization (cost-minimization) problem under the differential privacy constraint.
1) Differential Privacy Constraint: A general randomized releasing mechanism K is a family of noise probability distribu-
tions indexed by the query output (denoted by t), i.e.,
K = {Pt : t ∈ R}, (16)
and given dataset D, the mechanism K will release the query output t = q(D) corrupted by additive random noise with
probability distribution Pt:
K(D) = t+Xt, (17)
where Xt is a random variable with probability distribution Pt.
4The differential privacy constraint (2) on K is that for any t1, t2 ∈ R such that |t1 − t2| ≤ ∆ (corresponding to the query
outputs for two neighboring datasets) ,
Pt1(S) ≤ ePt2(S + t1 − t2),∀ measurable set S ⊂ R, (18)
where for any t ∈ R, S + t := {s+ t | s ∈ S}.
2) Utility Model: The utility model we use in this work is a very general one, which is also used in the works by Ghosh,
Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [6], Gupte and Sundararajan [8], and Brenner and Nissim [7].
Consider a cost function L(·) : R→ R, which is a function of the additive noise. Given additive noise x, the cost is L(x).
Given query output t ∈ R, the additive noise is a random variable with probability distribution Pt, and thus the expectation of
the cost is ∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx). (19)
The objective is to minimize the worst case cost among all possible query output t ∈ R, i.e.,
minimize sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx). (20)
3) Optimization Problem: Combining the differential privacy constraint (18) and the objective function (20), we formulate
a functional optimization problem:
minimize
{Pt}t∈R
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx) (21)
subject to Pt1(S) ≤ ePt2(S + t1 − t2),∀ measurable set S ⊆ R, ∀|t1 − t2| ≤ ∆. (22)
C. An Overview of Our Results
1) Optimal Noise Probability Distribution: When the query output domain is the real line or the set of integers, we show
(subject to some mild technical conditions on the family of differentially private mechanisms) that adding query-output-
independent noise is optimal. Thus we only need to study what the optimal noise probability distribution is. Let P denote the
probability distribution of the noise added to the query output. Then the optimization problem (21) and (22) is reduced to
minimize
P
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) (23)
subject to P(S) ≤ eP(S + d),∀ measurable set S ⊆ R, ∀|d| ≤ ∆. (24)
Consider a staircase-shaped probability distribution with probability density function (p.d.f.) fγ(·) defined as
fγ(x) =

a(γ) x ∈ [0, γ∆)
e−a(γ) x ∈ [γ∆,∆)
e−kfγ(x− k∆) x ∈ [k∆, (k + 1)∆) for k ∈ N
fγ(−x) x < 0
(25)
where
a(γ) , 1− e
−
2∆(γ + e−(1− γ)) (26)
is a normalizing constant to make
∫
x∈R fγ(x)dx = 1.
Our main result is
Theorem 1. If the cost function L(·) is symmetric and increasing, and supx≥T L(x+1)L(x) < +∞ for some T > 0, the optimal
noise probability distribution has a staircase-shaped probability density function fγ∗(·), where
γ∗ = arg min
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)fγ(x)dx. (27)
We plot the probability density functions of Laplace mechanism and staircase mechanism in Figure 1. Figure 3 in Section
III gives a precise description of staircase mechanism.
The staircase mechanism is specified by three parameters: , ∆, and γ∗ which is determined by  and the cost function L(·).
For certain classes of cost functions, there are closed-form expressions for the optimal γ∗.
5(a) Laplace Mechanism (b) Staircase Mechanism
Fig. 1: Probability Density Functions of Laplacian Mechanism and Staircase Mechanism
2) Applications: Minimum Noise Magnitude and Noise Power: We apply our main result Theorem 3 to two typical cost
functions L(x) = |x| and L(x) = x2, which measure noise magnitude and noise power, respectively. We derive the closed-form
expressions for the optimal parameters γ∗ for these two cost functions. Comparing the optimal performances with those of
the Laplacian mechanism, we show that in the high privacy regime ( is small), the Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically
optimal as  → 0; in the low privacy regime ( is large), the minimum expectation of noise amplitude and minimum noise
power are Θ(∆e−

2 ) and Θ(∆2e−
2
3 ) as  → +∞, while the expectation of noise amplitude and power using the Laplacian
mechanism are ∆ and
2∆2
2 , respectively, where ∆ is the sensitivity of the query function. We conclude that the gains are more
pronounced in the low privacy regime.
3) Extension to the Discrete Setting: Since for many important practical applications query functions are integer-valued,
we also derive the optimal differentially private mechanisms for answering a single integer-valued query function. We show
that adding query-output independent noise is optimal under a mild technical condition, and the optimal noise probability
distribution has a staircase-shaped probability mass function, which can be viewed as the discrete variant of the staircase
mechanism in the continuous setting.
This result helps us directly compare our work and the existing works [6], [8] on integer-valued query functions. Our result
shows that for integer-valued query function, the optimal noise probability mass function is also staircase-shaped, and in the
case the sensitivity ∆ = 1, the optimal probability mass function is reduced to the geometric distribution, which was derived
in [6], [8]. Therefore, this result can be viewed as a generalization of [6], [8] in the discrete setting for query functions with
arbitrary sensitivity.
D. Connection to the Literature
In this section, we discuss the relations of our results and some directly related works in the literature, and the implications
of our results on other works.
1) Laplacian Mechanism vs Staircase Mechanism: The Laplacian mechanism is specified by two parameters,  and the query
function sensitivity ∆.  and ∆ completely characterize the differential privacy constraint. On the other hand, the staircase
mechanism is specified by three parameters, , ∆, and γ∗ which is determined by  and the utility function/cost function. For
certain classes of utility functions/cost functions, there are closed-form expressions for the optimal γ∗.
From the two examples given in Section IV, we can see that although the Laplacian mechanism is not strictly optimal, in
the high privacy regime (→ 0), Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal:
• For the expectation of noise amplitude, the additive gap from the optimal values goes to 0 as → 0,
• For noise power, the additive gap from the optimal values is upper bounded by a constant as → 0.
However, in the low privacy regime ( → +∞), the multiplicative gap from the optimal values can be arbitrarily large. We
conclude that in the high privacy regime, the Laplacian mechanism is nearly optimal, while in the low privacy regime significant
improvement can be achieved by using the staircase mechanism. We plot the multiplicative gain of staircase mechanism over
Laplacian mechanism for expectation of noise amplitude and noise power in Figure 2, where VOptimal is the optimal (minimum)
cost, which is achieved by staircase mechanism, and VLap is the cost of Laplacian mechanism. We can see that for  ≈ 10, the
staircase mechanism has about 15-fold and 23-fold improvement, with noise amplitude and power respectively. While  ≈ 10
corresponds to really low privacy, our results show that low privacy can be had very cheaply (particularly when compared to
the state of the art Laplacian mechanism).
Since the staircase mechanism is derived under the same problem setting as Laplacian mechanism, the staircase mecha-
nism can be applied wherever Laplacian mechanism is used, and it performs strictly better than Laplacian mechanism (and
significantly better in low privacy scenarios).
2) Relation to Shamai and Verdu, [48]: Shamai and Verdu [48] consider the minimum variance noise for a fixed value
of the average of false alarm and missed detection probabilities of binary hypothesis testing. In [48], the binary hypotheses
6(a) 0 <  ≤ 10 (b) 10 ≤  ≤ 20
Fig. 2: Multiplicative Gain of the Staircase Mechanism over the Laplacian Mechanism.
correspond to the signal being in a binary set {−∆,+∆}. Their solution involved the noise being discrete and, further, having
a pmf on the integer lattice (scaled by ∆). Our setting is related, but is differentiated via the following two key distinctions:
• Instead of a constraint on the sum of false alarm and missed detection probabilities, we have constraints on symmetric
weighted combinations of the two error probabilities (as in Equations (10) and (11)).
• Instead of the binary hypotheses corresponding to the signal being in a binary set {−∆,+∆} we consider all possible
binary hypotheses for the signal to be in {x1, x2} where x1, x2 ∈ [−∆,∆] are arbitrtary.
3) Relation to Ghosh et. al. [6] : Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [6] show that for a single count query with
sensitivity ∆ = 1, for a general class of utility functions, to minimize the expected cost under a Bayesian framework the
optimal mechanism to preserve differential privacy is the geometric mechanism, which adds noise with geometric distribution.
We discuss the relations and differences between [6] and our work in the following: Both [6] and our work are similar in
that, given the query output, the cost function only depends on the additive noise magnitude, and is an increasing function of
noise magnitude. On the other hand, there are two main differences:
• [6] works under a Bayesian setting, while ours is to minimize the worst case cost.
• [6] studies a count query where the query output is integer-valued, bounded and sensitivity is unity. In our work, we first
study general real-valued query function where the query output can take any real value, and then generalize the result
to discrete setting where query output is integer valued. In both cases, the sensitivity of query functions can be arbitrary,
not restricted to one.
4) Relation to Gupte and Sundararajan [8] : Gupte and Sundararajan [8] derive the optimal noise probability distributions
for a single count query with sensitivity ∆ = 1 for minimax (risk-averse) users. Their model is the same as the one in [6]
except that their objective function is to minimize the worst case cost, the same as our objective. [8] shows that although there
is no universally optimal solution to the minimax optimization problem in [8] for a general class of cost functions, each solution
(corresponding to different cost functions) can be derived from the same geometric mechanism by randomly remapping.
As in [6], [8] assumes the query-output is bounded. Our result shows that when the query sensitivity is one, without any
boundedness knowledge about the query-output, the optimal mechanism is to add random noise with geometric distribution to
the query output.
5) Relation to Brenner and Nissim [7] : While [6] shows that for a single count query with sensitivity ∆ = 1, there is a
universally optimal mechanism for a general class of utility functions under a Bayesian framework, Brenner and Nissim [7]
show that for general query functions no universally optimal mechanisms exist. Indeed, this follows directly from our results:
under our optimization framework, the optimal mechanism is adding noise with staircase-shaped probability distribution which
is specified by three parameters ,∆ and γ∗, where in general γ∗ depends on the cost function. Generally, for different cost
functions, the optimal noise probability distributions have staircase-shaped probability density functions specified by different
parameters.
6) Relation to Nissim, Raskhodnikova and Smith [47] : Nissim, Raskhodnikova and Smith [47] show that for certain
nonlinear query functions, one can improve the accuracy by adding data-dependent noise calibrated to the smooth sensitivity
of the query function, which is based on the local sensitivity of the query function. In our model, we use the global sensitivity
of the query function only, and assume that the local sensitivity is the same as the global sensitivity, which holds for a general
class of query functions, e.g., count, sum.
7) Relation to Hardt and Talwar [3] : Hardt and Talwar [3] study the tradeoff between privacy and error for answering
a set of linear queries over a histogram in a differentially private way. The error is defined as the worst expectation of the
`2-norm of the noise. The lower bound given in [3] is Ω(−1d
√
d), where d is the number of linear queries. An immediate
consequence of our result is that for fixed d, when  → +∞, an upper bound of Θ(e− 3d d√d) is achievable by adding
independent staircase-shaped noise with parameter d to each component.
8) Relation to Other Works: There are many existing works on studying how to improve the accuracy for answering more
complex queries under differential privacy, in which the basic building block is the standard Laplacian mechanism. For example,
7Hay et. al. [49] show that one can improve the accuracy for a general class of histogram queries, by exploiting the consistency
constraints on the query output, and Li et. al. [5] study how to optimize linear counting queries under differential privacy by
carefully choosing the set of linear queries to be answered. In these works, the error is measured by the mean squared error
of query output estimates, which corresponds to the variance of the noise added to the query output to preserve differential
privacy. In terms of , the error bound in these works scales linearly to 12 , because of the use of Laplacian noise. If Laplacian
distribution is replaced by staircase distribution in these works, one can improve the error bound to Θ(e−C) (for some constant
C which depends on the number of queries) when → +∞ (corresponding to the low privacy regime).
E. Organization
The paper is organized as follows. We show the optimality of query-output independent perturbation in Section II, and present
the optimal differentially private mechanism, staircase mechanism, in Section III. In Section IV, we apply our main result to
derive the optimal noise probability distribution with minimum expectation of noise amplitude and power, respectively, and
compare the performances with the Laplacian mechanism. Section V presents the asymptotic properties of γ∗ in the staircase
mechanism for momentum cost functions, and suggests a heuristic choice of γ that appears to work well for a wide class of
cost functions. Section VI generalizes the staircase mechanism for integer-valued query function in the discrete setting, and
Section VII extends the staircase mechanism to the abstract setting. Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. OPTIMALITY OF QUERY-QUTPUT INDEPENDENT PERTURBATION
Recall that the optimization problem we study in this work is
minimize
{Pt}t∈R
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx) (28)
subject to Pt1(S) ≤ ePt2(S + t1 − t2),∀ measurable set S ⊆ R, ∀|t1 − t2| ≤ ∆, (29)
where Pt is the noise probability distribution when the query output is t.
Our claim is that in the optimal family of probability distributions, Pt can be independent of t, i.e., the probability distribution
of noise is independent of the query output. We prove this claim under a technical condition which assumes that {Pt}t∈R is
piecewise constant and periodic (the period can be arbitrary) in terms of t.
For any positive integer n, and for any positive real number T , define
KT,n , { {Pt}t∈R | {Pt}t∈R satisfies (22), Pt = Pk Tn , for t ∈ [k
T
n
, (k + 1)
T
n
), k ∈ Z,
and Pt+T = Pt,∀t ∈ R}. (30)
Theorem 2. Given any family of probability distribution {Pt}t∈R ∈ ∪T>0 ∪n≥1 KT,n, there exists a probability distribution
P∗ such that the family of probability distributions {P∗t }t∈R with P∗t ≡ P∗ satisfies the differential privacy constraint (22)
and
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P∗t (dx) ≤ sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx). (31)
Proof: Here we briefly discuss the main proof technique. For complete proof, see Appendix A. The proof of Theorem
2 uses two properties on the family of probability distributions satisfying differential privacy constraint (22). First, we show
that for any family of probability distributions satisfying (22), any translation of the probability distributions will also preserve
differential privacy, and the cost is the same. Second, we show that given a collection of families of probability distributions
each of which satisfies (22), we can take a convex combination of them to construct a new family of probability distributions
satisfying (22) and the new cost is not worse. Due to these two properties, given any family of probability distributions
{Pt}t∈R ∈ ∪T>0 ∪n≥1 KT,n, one can take a convex combination of different translations of {Pt}t∈R to construct {P∗t }t∈R
with P∗t ≡ P∗, and the cost is not worse.
Theorem 2 states that if we assume the family of noise probability distributions is piecewise constant (over intervals with
length Tn ) in terms of t, and periodic over t (with period T ), where T, n can be arbitrary, then in the optimal mechanism we
can assume Pt does not dependent on t. We conjecture that the technical condition can be done away with.
III. OPTIMAL NOISE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
Due to Theorem 2, to derive the optimal randomized mechanism to preserve differential privacy, we can restrict to noise-
adding mechanisms where the noise probability distribution does not depend on the query output. In this section we state our
main result Theorem 3 on the optimal noise probability distribution.
8Fig. 3: The Staircase-Shaped Probability Density Function fγ(x)
Let P denote the probability distribution of the noise added to the query output. Then the optimization problem in (21) and
(22) is reduced to
minimize
P
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) (32)
subject to P(S) ≤ eP(S + d),∀ measurable set S ⊆ R, ∀|d| ≤ ∆. (33)
We assume that the cost function L(·) satisfies two (natural) properties.
Property 1. L(x) is a symmetric function, and monotonically increasing for x ≥ 0, i.e, L(x) satisfies
L(x) = L(−x),∀x ∈ R, (34)
and
L(x) ≤ L(y),∀0 ≤ x ≤ y. (35)
In addition, we assume L(x) satisfies a mild technical condition which essentially says that L(·) does not increase too fast
(while still allowing it to be unbounded).
Property 2. There exists a positive integer T such that L(T ) > 0 and L(x) satisfies
sup
x≥T
L(x+ 1)
L(x) < +∞. (36)
Consider a staircase-shaped probability distribution with probability density function (p.d.f.) fγ(·) defined as
fγ(x) =

a(γ) x ∈ [0, γ∆)
e−a(γ) x ∈ [γ∆,∆)
e−kfγ(x− k∆) x ∈ [k∆, (k + 1)∆) for k ∈ N
fγ(−x) x < 0
(37)
where
a(γ) , 1− e
−
2∆(γ + e−(1− γ)) (38)
is a normalizing constant to make
∫
x∈R fγ(x)dx = 1. It is easy to check that for any γ ∈ [0, 1], the probability distribution
with p.d.f. fγ(·) satisfies the differential privacy constraint (33). Indeed, the probability density function fγ(x) satisfies
fγ(x) ≤ efγ(x+ d),∀x ∈ R, |d| ≤ ∆, (39)
which implies (33).
Let SP denote the set of all probability distributions satisfying (33). Our main result on the optimal noise probability
distribution is:
9Theorem 3. If the cost function L(x) satisfies Property 1 and Property 2, then
inf
P∈SP
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)fγ(x)dx. (40)
Proof: Here we briefly discuss the main proof idea and technique. First, by deriving several properties on the probability
distributions satisfying the -differential privacy constraint, we show that without loss of generality, one can “discretize” any
valid probability distribution, even for those which do not have probability density functions. Second, we show that to minimize
the cost, the probability density function of the discretized probability distribution should be monotonically and geometrically
decaying. Lastly, we show that the optimal probability density function should be staircase-shaped. For the complete proof,
see Appendix B.
Therefore, the optimal noise probability distribution to preserve -differential privacy for any real-valued query function has a
staircase-shaped probability density function, which is specified by three parameters , ∆ and γ∗ = arg min
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R L(x)fγ(x)dx.
A natural and simple algorithm to generate random noise with staircase distribution is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Generation of Random Variable with Staircase Distribution
Input: , ∆, and γ ∈ [0, 1].
Output: X , a random variable (r.v.) with staircase distribution specified by ,∆ and γ.
Generate a r.v. S with Pr[S = 1] = Pr[S = −1] = 12 .
Generate a geometric r.v. G with Pr[G = i] = (1− b)bi for integer i ≥ 0, where b = e−.
Generate a r.v. U uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
Generate a binary r.v. B with Pr[B = 0] = γγ+(1−γ)b and Pr[B = 1] =
(1−γ)b
γ+(1−γ)b .
X ← S ((1−B) ((G+ γU)∆) +B ((G+ γ + (1− γ)U)∆)).
Output X .
In the formula,
X ← S ((1−B) ((G+ γU)∆) +B ((G+ γ + (1− γ)U)∆)) , (41)
• S determines the sign of the noise,
• G determines which interval [G∆, (G+ 1)∆) the noise lies in,
• B determines which subinterval of [G∆, (G+ γ)∆) and [(G+ γ)∆, (G+ 1)∆) the noise lies in,
• U helps to uniformly sample the subinterval.
IV. APPLICATIONS
In this section, we apply our main result Theorem 3 to derive the parameter γ∗ of the staircase mechanism with minimum
expectation of noise magnitude and noise second moment, respectively, and then compare the performances with the Laplacian
mechanism.
A. Optimal Noise Probability Distribution with Minimum Expectation of Noise Amplitude
To minimize the expectation of amplitude, we have cost function L(x) = |x|, and it is easy to see that it satisfies Property
1 and Property 2.
To simplify notation, define b , e−, and define
V (P) ,
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (42)
for a given probability distribution P .
Theorem 4. To minimize the expectation of the amplitude of noise, the optimal noise probability distribution has probability
density function fγ∗(·) with
γ∗ =
1
1 + e

2
, (43)
and the minimum expectation of noise amplitude is
V (Pγ∗) = ∆ e

2
e − 1 . (44)
Proof: See Appendix C.
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Fig. 4: Optimal γ∗ for cost function L(x) = x2
Next, we compare the performances of the optimal noise probability distribution and the Laplacian mechanism. The Laplace
distribution has probability density function
f(x) =
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ , (45)
where λ = ∆ . So the expectation of the amplitude of noise with Laplace distribution is
VLap ,
∫ +∞
−∞
|x|f(x)dx = ∆

. (46)
By comparing V (Pγ∗) and VLap, it is easy to see that in the high privacy regime ( is small) Laplacian mechanism is
asymptotically optimal, and the additive gap from optimal value goes to 0 as  → 0; in the low privacy regime ( is large),
VLap =
∆
 ), while V (Pγ∗) = Θ(∆e−

2 ). Indeed,
Corollary 5. Consider the cost function L(x) = |x|. In the high privacy regime ( is small),
VLap − V (Pγ∗) = ∆
(

24
− 7
3
5760
+O(5)
)
, (47)
as → 0.
And in the low privacy regime ( is large),
VLap =
∆

, (48)
V (Pγ∗) = Θ(∆e− 2 ), (49)
as → +∞.
B. Optimal Noise Probability Distribution with Minimum Power
Given the probability distribution P of the noise, the power of noise is defined as ∫
x∈R x
2P(dx). Accordingly, the cost
function L(x) = x2, and it is easy to see it satisfies Property 1 and Property 2.
Recall b , e−.
Theorem 6. To minimize the power of noise (accordingly, L(x) = x2), the optimal noise probability distribution has probability
density function fγ∗(·) with
γ∗ = − b
1− b +
(b− 2b2 + 2b4 − b5)1/3
21/3(1− b)2 , (50)
and the minimum power of noise is
V (Pγ∗) = ∆2 2
−2/3b2/3(1 + b)2/3 + b
(1− b)2 . (51)
Proof: See Appendix D.
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Next, we compare the performances of the optimal noise probability distribution and the Laplacian mechanism. The power
of noise with Laplace distribution with λ = ∆ is
VLap ,
∫ +∞
−∞
x2
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ dx = 2
∆2
2
. (52)
By comparing V (Pγ∗) and VLap, it is easy to see that in the high privacy regime ( is small) Laplacian mechanism is
asymptotically optimal, and the additive gap from optimal value is upper bounded by a constant as → 0; in the low privacy
regime ( is large), VLap = Θ( 2∆
2
2 ), while V (Pγ∗) = Θ(∆2e−
2
3 ). Indeed,
Corollary 7. Consider the cost function L(x) = x2. In the high privacy regime ( is small),
VLap − V (Pγ∗) = ∆2
(
1
12
− 
2
720
+O(4)
)
, (53)
as → 0.
And in the low privacy regime ( is large),
VLap =
2∆2
2
, (54)
V (Pγ∗) = Θ(∆2e− 23 ), (55)
as → +∞.
V. PROPERTY OF γ∗
In this section, we derive some asymptotic properties of the optimal γ∗ for moment cost functions, and give a heuristic
choice of γ which only depends on .
A. Asymptotic Properties of γ∗
In Section IV, we have seen that for the cost functions L(x) = |x| and L(x) = x2, the optimal γ∗ lies in the interval [0, 12 ]
for all  and is a monotonically decreasing function of ; and furthermore, γ∗ → 12 as  goes to 0, and γ∗ → 0 as  goes to
+∞.
We generalize these asymptotic properties of γ as a function of  to all moment cost functions. More precisely, given m ∈ N
and m ≥ 1,
Theorem 8. Consider the cost function L(x) = |x|m. Let γ∗ be the optimal γ in the staircase mechanism for L(x), i.e.,
γ∗ = arg min
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
|x|mfγ(x)dx. (56)
We have
γ∗ → 1
2
, as → 0, (57)
γ∗ → 0, as → +∞. (58)
Proof: See Appendix E.
Corollary 9. For all the cost functions L(·) which can be written as
L(x) =
n∑
i=1
αi|x|di , (59)
where n ≥ 1, αi ∈ R, di ∈ N and αi, di ≥ 0 for all i, the optimal γ∗ in the staircase mechanism has the following asymptotic
properties:
γ∗ → 1
2
, as → 0, (60)
γ∗ → 0, as → +∞. (61)
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B. A Heuristic Choice of γ
We have shown that in general the optimal γ∗ in the staircase mechanism depends on both  and the cost function L(·).
Here we give a heuristic choice of γ which depends only on , and show that the performance is reasonably good in the low
privacy regime.
Consider a particular choice of γ, which is
γ˜ :=
b
2
=
e−
2
. (62)
It is easy to see that γ˜ has the same asymptotic properties as the optimal γ∗ for momentum cost functions, i.e.,
γ˜ → 0, as b→ 0, (63)
γ˜ → 1
2
, as b→ 1. (64)
Furthermore, the probability that the noise magnitude is less than e
−
2 ∆ is approximately
1
3 in the low privacy regime
(→ +∞). Indeed,
Pr[|X| ≤ e
−
2
∆] = Pr[|X| ≤ γ˜∆] = 2a(γ˜)γ˜∆ = 1− b
γ˜ + b(1− γ˜) γ˜ =
b− b2
3b− b2 , (65)
which goes to 13 as → +∞ (accordingly, b→ 0).
On the other hand, for Laplace mechanism,
Pr[|X| ≤ e
−
2
∆] =
∫ e−
2 ∆
− e−2 ∆
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ dx = 1− e− e
−
2 , (66)
which goes to zero as → +∞.
We conclude that in the low privacy regime as → +∞, the staircase mechanism with the heuristic parameter γ˜ = e−2 can
guarantee with probability about 13 the additive noise is very close to zero, while the probability given by Laplacian mechanism
is approximately zero.
VI. EXTENSION TO THE DISCRETE SETTING
In this section, we extend our main result Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 to the discrete settings, and show that the optimal
noise-adding mechanism in the discrete setting is a discrete variant of the staircase mechanism in the continuous setting.
A. Problem Formulation
We first give the problem formulation in the discrete setting.
Consider an integer-valued query function 1
q : Dn → Z, (67)
where Dn is the domain of the databases. Let ∆ denote the sensitivity of the query function q as defined in (12). Clearly, ∆
is an integer in this discrete setting.
In the discrete setting, a generic randomized mechanism K is a family of noise probability distributions over the domain Z
indexed by the query output (denoted by i), i.e.,
K = {Pi : i ∈ Z}, (68)
and given dataset D, the mechanism K will release the query output i = q(D) corrupted by additive random noise with
probability distribution Pi:
K(D) = i+Xi, (69)
where Xi is a discrete random variable with probability distribution Pi.
Then, the -differential privacy constraint (2) on K is that for any i1, i2 ∈ Z such that |i1 − i2| ≤ ∆ (corresponding to the
query outputs for two neighboring datasets), and for any subset S ⊂ Z,
Pi1(j) ≤ ePi2(j + i1 − i2),∀j ∈ Z, |i1 − i2| ≤ ∆, (70)
and the goal is to minimize the worst-case cost
sup
i∈Z
+∞∑
j=−∞
L(j)Pi(j) (71)
subject to the differential privacy constraint (70).
1Without loss of generality, we assume that in the discrete setting the query output is integer-valued. Indeed, any uniformly-spaced discrete setting can be
reduced to the integer-valued setting by scaling the query output.
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B. Optimality of Query-Qutput Independent Perturbation
In this section, we show that query-output independent perturbation is optimal in the discrete setting.
For any integer n ≥ 1, define
Kn , { {Pi}i∈Z| {Pi}i∈Z satisfies (70), and Pi+n = Pi,∀i ∈ Z}. (72)
Theorem 10. Given any family of probability distribution {Pi}i∈Z ∈ ∪n≥1Kn, there exists a probability distribution P∗ such
that the family of probability distributions {P∗i }i∈Z with P∗i ≡ P∗ satisfies the differential privacy constraint (70) and
sup
i∈Z
+∞∑
j=−∞
L(j)P∗i (j) ≤ sup
i∈Z
+∞∑
j=−∞
L(j)Pi(j). (73)
Proof: The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 2, and thus is omitted.
Theorem 10 states that if we assume the family of noise probability distributions is periodic in terms of i (the period can
be arbitrary), then in the optimal mechanism we can assume Pi does not dependent on i. We conjecture that the technical
condition can be done away with.
C. Optimal Noise Probability Distribution
Due to Theorem 10, we restrict to query-output independent perturbation mechanisms.
Let q(D) be the value of the query function evaluated at dataset D. The noise-adding mechanism K will output
K(D) = q(D) +X, (74)
where X is the integer-valued noise added by the mechanism to the output of query function. Let P be the probability
distribution of the noise X . Then the optimization problem we study is
minimize
P
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i) (75)
subject to P(i) ≤ eP(i+ d),∀i ∈ Z, d ∈ Z, |d| ≤ |∆|. (76)
It turns out that when the cost function L(·) is symmetric and monotonically increasing for i ≥ 0, the solution to the above
optimization problem is a discrete variant of the staircase mechanism in the continuous setting.
As in the continuous setting, we also assume that the cost function L(·) is symmetric and monotonically increasing for
x ≥ 0, i.e.,
Property 3.
L(i) = L(−i),∀i ∈ Z (77)
L(i) ≤ L(i),∀i, j ∈ Z, 0 ≤ i ≤ j. (78)
The easiest case is ∆ = 1. In the case that ∆ = 1, the solution is the geometric mechanism, which was proposed in [6].
Recall b , e−.
Theorem 11. If the cost function L(·) satisfies Property 3 and ∆ = 1, then the geometric mechanism, which has a probability
mass function P with P(i) = 1−b1+bb|i|,∀i ∈ Z, is the optimal solution to (75).
Proof: See Appendix F.
For fixed general ∆ ≥ 2, consider a class of symmetric and staircase-shaped probability mass functions defined as follows.
Given an integer 1 ≤ r ≤ ∆, denote Pr as the probability mass function defined by
Pr(i) =

a(r) 0 ≤ i < r
e−a(r) r ≤ i < ∆
e−kPr(i− k∆) k∆ ≤ i < (k + 1)∆ for k ∈ N
Pr(−i) i < 0
(79)
for i ∈ Z, where
a(r) , 1− b
2r + 2b(∆− r)− (1− b) . (80)
It is easy to verify that for any 1 ≤ r ≤ ∆, Pr is a valid probability mass function and it satisfies the -differential privacy
constraint (76). We plot the staircase-shaped probability mass function Pr(i) in Figure 5.
Let SP be the set of all probability mass functions which satisfy the -differential privacy constraint (76).
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Fig. 5: The Staircase-Shaped Probability Mass Function Pr(i)
Theorem 12. For ∆ ≥ 2, if the cost function L(x) satisfies Property 3, then
inf
P∈SP
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i) = min
{r∈N|1≤r≤∆}
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pr(i). (81)
Proof: See Appendix F.
Therefore, the optimal noise probability distribution to preserve -differential privacy for integer-valued query function has a
staircase-shaped probability mass function, which is specified by three parameters , ∆ and r∗ = arg min
{r∈N|1≤r≤∆}
∑+∞
i=−∞ L(i)Pr(i).
In the case ∆ = 1, the staircase-shaped probability mass function is reduced to the geometric mechanism.
VII. EXTENSION TO THE ABSTRACT SETTING
In this section, we show how to extend the staircase mechanism to the abstract setting. The approach is essentially the same
as the exponential mechanism in [50], except that we replace the exponential function by the staircase function.
Consider a privacy mechanism which maps an input from a domain Dn to some output in a range R. Let µ be the base
measure of R. In addition, we have a cost function C : Dn ×R → [0,+∞).
Define ∆ as
∆ , max
r∈R, D1,D2⊆Dn:|D1−D2|≤1
|C(D1, r)− C(D2, r)|, (82)
i.e., the maximum difference of cost function for any two inputs which differ only on one single value over all r ∈ R [50].
A randomized mechanism K achieves -differential privacy if for any D1, D2 ⊆ Dn such that |D1 −D2| ≤ 1, and for any
measurable subset S ⊂ R,
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D2) ∈ S]. (83)
Definition 4 (staircase mechanism in the abstract setting). For fixed γ ∈ [0, 1], given input D ∈ Dn, the staircase mechanism
in the abstract setting will output an element in R with the probability distribution defined as
PD(S) =
∫
r∈S fγ(C(D, r))µ(dr)∫
r∈R fγ(C(D, r))µ(dr)
,∀ measurable set S ⊂ R, (84)
where fγ is the staircase-shaped function defined in (37).
Theorem 13. The staircase mechanism in the abstract setting in Definition 4 achieves 2-differential privacy.
Proof: For any D1, D2 ∈ Dn such that |D1 −D2| ≤ 1, and for any measurable set S ⊂ R,
PD1(S) =
∫
r∈S fγ(C(D1, r))µ(dr)∫
r∈R fγ(C(D1, r))µ(dr)
(85)
≤ e
∫
r∈S fγ(C(D2, r))µ(dr)∫
r∈R fγ(C(D1, r))µ(dr)
(86)
≤ ee
∫
r∈S fγ(C(D2, r))µ(dr)∫
r∈R fγ(C(D2, r))µ(dr)
(87)
= e2PD2(S), (88)
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where we have used the property that fγ(C(D1, r)) ≤ efγ(C(D2, r)) and fγ(C(D2, r)) ≤ efγ(C(D1, r)) for all r ∈ R.
Therefore, the staircase mechanism in the abstract setting achieves 2-differential privacy for any γ ∈ [0, 1].
In the case that the output range R is the set of real numbers R and the cost function C(d, r) = |r − q(d)| for some
real-valued query function q, the above mechanism is reduced to the staircase mechanism in the continuous setting.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work we show that adding query-output independent noise with staircase distribution is optimal among all randomized
mechanisms (subject to a mild technical condition) that preserve differential privacy. The optimality is for single real-
valued query function under a very general utility-maximization (or cost-minimization) framework. The class of optimal
noise probability distributions has staircase-shaped probability density functions which are symmetric (around the origin),
monotonically decreasing and geometrically decaying for x ≥ 0. The staircase mechanism can be viewed as a geometric
mixture of uniform probability distributions, providing a simple algorithmic description for the mechanism. Furthermore, the
staircase mechanism naturally generalizes to discrete query output settings as well as more abstract settings.
We explicitly derive the parameter of the staircase mechanism with minimum expectation of noise amplitude and power.
Comparing the optimal performances with those of the standard Laplacian mechanism, we show that in the high privacy regime
( is small), Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal as  → 0; in the low privacy regime ( is large), the minimum
expectation of noise amplitude and minimum noise power are Θ(∆e−

2 ) and Θ(∆2e−
2
3 ) as → +∞, while the expectation
of noise amplitude and power using the Laplacian mechanism are ∆ and
2∆2
2 , where ∆ is the sensitivity of the query function.
We conclude that the gains are more pronounced in the moderate to low privacy regime.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first give two lemmas on the properties of {Pt}t∈R which satisfies (22).
Lemma 14. Given {Pt}t∈R satisfying (22), and given any scalar α ∈ R, consider the family of noise probability measures
{P(α)t }t∈R defined by
P(α)t , Pt+α,∀t ∈ R. (89)
Then {P(α)t }t∈R also satisfies the differential privacy constraint, i.e., ∀|t1 − t2| ≤ ∆,
P(α)t1 (S) ≤ eP(α)t2 (S + t1 − t2). (90)
Furthermore, {Pt}t∈R and {P(α)t }t∈R have the same cost, i.e.,
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx) = sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(α)t (dx). (91)
Proof: Since by definition the family of probability measures {P(α)t }t∈R is a shifted version of {Pt}t∈R, (91) holds.
Next we show that {P(α)t }t∈R satisfies (90). Given any t1, t2 such that |t1 − t2| ≤ ∆, then for any measurable set S ⊂ R,
we have
P(α)t1 = Pt1+α(S) (92)
≤ ePt2+α(S + (t1 + α)− (t2 + α)) (93)
= ePt2+α(S + t1 − t2) (94)
= eP(α)t2 (S + t1 − t2). (95)
This completes the proof.
Next we show that given a collection of families of probability measures each of which satisfies the differential privacy
constraint (22), we can take a convex combination of them to construct a new family of probability measures satisfying (22)
and the new cost is not worse. More precisely,
Lemma 15. Given a collection of finite number of families of probability measures {P [i]t }t∈R (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}), such that
for each i, {P [i]t }t∈R satisfies (22) and
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P [i]t (dx) = Q,∀i, (96)
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for some real number Q, consider the family of probability measures {ν˜t}t∈R defined by
ν˜t ,
n∑
i=1
ciP [i]t ,∀t ∈ R, (97)
i.e., for any measurable set S ⊂ R,
ν˜t(S) =
n∑
i=1
ciP [i]t (S), (98)
where ci ≥ 0, and
∑n
i=1 ci = 1.
Then {ν˜t}t∈R also satisfies the differential privacy constraint (22), and
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)ν˜t(dx) ≤ Q. (99)
Proof: First we show that {ν˜t}t∈R also satisfies the differential privacy constraint (22). Indeed, ∀ |t1 − t2| ≤ ∆, ∀
measurable set S ⊂ R,
ν˜t1(S) =
n∑
i=1
ciP [i]t1 (S) (100)
≤
n∑
i=1
cie
P [i]t2 (S + t1 − t2) (101)
= eν˜t2(S + t1 − t2). (102)
Next we show that the cost of {ν˜t}t∈R is no bigger than Q. Indeed, for any t ∈ R,∫
x∈R
L(x)ν˜t(dx) =
n∑
i=1
ci
∫
x∈R
L(x)ν˜[i]t (dx) (103)
≤
n∑
i=1
ciQ (104)
= Q. (105)
Therefore,
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)ν˜t(dx) ≤ Q. (106)
Applying Lemma 14 and Lemma 15, we can prove the conjecture under the assumption that the family of probability
measures {Pt}t∈R is piecewise constant and periodic over t.
Proof of Theorem 2: We first prove that for any family of probability measures {Pt}t∈R ∈ KT,n, there exists a new
family of probability measures {P˜t}t∈R ∈ KT,n such that P˜t = P˜ for all t ∈ R, i.e., the added noise is independent of query
output t, and
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P˜t(dx) ≤ sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx). (107)
Indeed, consider the collection of probability measures {P(iTn )t }t∈R for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1}, where {P(α)t } is defined in
(89). Due to Lemma 14, for all i, {P(iTn )t }t∈R satisfies the differential privacy constraint (22), and the cost is the same as the
cost of {Pt}t∈R.
Define
P˜t =
n−1∑
i=0
1
n
P(iTn )t . (108)
Then due to Lemma 15, {P˜t}t∈R satisfies (22), and the cost of is not worse, i.e.,
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P˜t(dx) ≤ sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx). (109)
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Furthermore, since {Pt}t∈R ∈ KT,n, for any t ∈ R,
P˜t =
n−1∑
i=0
1
n
P(iTn )t =
n−1∑
i=0
1
n
PiTn . (110)
Hence, P˜t is independent of t.
Therefore, among the collection of probability measures in ∪T>0∪n≥1KT,n, to minimize the cost we only need to consider
the families of noise probability measures which are independent of the query output t. Then due to Theorem 3, the staircase
mechanism is optimal among all query-output-independent noise-adding mechanisms. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In this section, we give detailed and rigorous proof of Theorem 3.
A. Outline of Proof
The key idea of the proof is to use a sequence of probability distributions with piecewise constant probability density
functions to approximate any probability distribution satisfying the differential privacy constraint (33). The proof consists of 8
steps in total, and in each step we narrow down the set of probability distributions where the optimal probability distribution
should lie in:
• Step 1 proves that we only need to consider symmetric probability distributions.
• Step 2 and Step 3 prove that we only need to consider probability distributions which have symmetric piecewise constant
probability density functions.
• Step 4 proves that we only need to consider those symmetric piecewise constant probability density functions which are
monotonically decreasing for x ≥ 0.
• Step 5 proves that optimal probability density function should periodically decay.
• Step 6, Step 7 and Step 8 prove that the optimal probability density function over the interval [0,∆) is a step function,
and they conclude the proof of Theorem 3.
B. Step 1
Define
V ∗ , inf
P∈SP
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (111)
Our goal is to prove that V ∗ = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R L(x)Pγ(dx).
If V ∗ = +∞, then due to the definition of V ∗, we have
inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ(dx) ≥ V ∗ = +∞, (112)
and thus infγ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R L(x) = V ∗ = +∞. So we only need to consider the case V ∗ < +∞, i.e., V ∗ is finite. Therefore, in
the rest of the proof, we assume V ∗ is finite.
First we prove that we only need to consider symmetric probability measures.
Lemma 16. Given P ∈ SP , define a symmetric probability distribution Psym as
Psym(S) , P(S) + P(−S)
2
,∀ measurable set S ⊆ R, (113)
where the set −S , {−x | x ∈ S}. Then Psym ∈ SP , i.e., Psym satisfies the differential privacy constraint (33), and∫
x∈R
L(x)Psym(dx) =
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (114)
Proof: It is easy to verify that Psym is a valid probability distribution. Due to the definition of Psym in (113), we have
Psym(S) = P(S) + P(−S)
2
= Psym(−S), (115)
for any measurable set S ⊆ R. Thus, Psym is a symmetric probability distribution.
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Next, we show that Psym satisfies (33). Indeed, ∀ measurable set S ⊆ R and ∀|d| ≤ ∆,
Psym(S) = P(S) + P(−S)
2
(116)
≤ e
P(S + d) + eP(−S − d)
2
(117)
=
eP(S + d) + eP(−(S + d))
2
(118)
= ePsym(S + d), (119)
where in (117) we use the facts P(S) ≤ eP(S + d) and P(−S) ≤ eP(−S − d).
Lastly, since L(x) is symmetric, ∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) =
∫
x∈R
L(x) + L(−x)
2
P(dx) (120)
=
∫
x∈R
L(x)Psym(dx). (121)
Therefore, if we define
SP sym , {Psym|P ∈ SP}, (122)
due to Lemma 16,
Lemma 17.
V ∗ = inf
P∈SPsym
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (123)
C. Step 2
Next we prove that for any probability distribution P satisfying differential privacy constraint (33), the probability Pr(X =
x) = 0,∀x ∈ R, and P([y, z]) 6= 0 for any y < z ∈ R.
Lemma 18. ∀P ∈ SP,∀x ∈ R, P({x}) = 0. And, for any y < z ∈ R, P([y, z]) 6= 0.
Proof: Given P ∈ SP , suppose P({x0}) = p0 > 0, for some x0 ∈ R. Then for any x ∈ [x0, x0 + ∆],
P({x}) ≥ e−, (124)
due to (33).
So P({x}) is strictly lower bounded by a positive constant for uncountable number of x, and thus P([x0, x0 + ∆]) = +∞,
which contradicts with the fact P is a probability distribution.
Therefore, ∀P ∈ SP,∀x ∈ R, P({x}) = 0.
Suppose P([y, z]) = 0 for some y < z ∈ R. Then from (33) we have for any |d| ≤ ∆,
P([y + d, z + d]) ≤ eP([y, z]) = 0, (125)
and thus P([y+ d, z+ d]) = 0. By induction, for any k ∈ Z, P([y+ kd, z+ kd]) = 0, which implies that P((−∞,+∞)) = 0.
Contradiction. So for any y < z ∈ R, P([y, z]) 6= 0.
D. Step 3
In this subsection, we show that for any P ∈ SP sym with
V (P) ,
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) < +∞, (126)
we can use a sequence of probability measures {Pi ∈ SP sym}i≥1 with symmetric piecewise constant probability density
functions to approximate P with limi→+∞ V (Pi) = V (P).
Lemma 19. Given P ∈ SP sym with V (P) < +∞, any positive integer i ∈ N , define Pi as the probability distribution with a
symmetric probability density function fi(x) defined as
fi(x) =
{
ak , P([k
D
i ,(k+1)
D
i )
D
i
x ∈ [kDi , (k + 1)Di ) for k ∈ N
fi(−x) x < 0
(127)
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Then Pi ∈ SP sym and
lim
i→+∞
V (Pi) = V (P). (128)
Proof:
First we prove that Pi ∈ SP sym, i.e., Pi is symmetric and satisfies the differential privacy constraint (33).
By definition fi(x) is a symmetric and nonnegative function, and∫ +∞
−∞
fi(x)dx = 2
∫ +∞
0
fi(x)dx (129)
= 2
∫
x∈[0,+∞)
P(dx) (130)
= 2
∫
x∈(0,+∞)
P(dx) (131)
= 1, (132)
where in (131) we used the fact P({0}) = 0 due to Lemma 18. In addition, due to Lemma 18, ak > 0,∀k ∈ N.
So fi(x) is a valid symmetric probability density function, and thus Pi is a valid symmetric probability distribution.
Define the density sequence of Pi as the sequence {a0, a1, a2, . . . , an, . . . }. Since P satisfies (33), it is easy to see that
aj ≤ eaj+k and aj+k ≤ eaj ,∀j ≥ 0, 0 ≤ k ≤ i. (133)
Therefore, for any x, y such that |x− y| ≤ ∆, we have
fi(x) ≤ efi(y) and fi(y) ≤ efi(x), (134)
which implies that Pi satisfies (33). Hence, Pi ∈ SP sym.
Next we show that
lim
i→+∞
V (Pi) = V (P). (135)
Since L(x) satisfies Property 2, we can assume there exists a constant B > 0 such that
L(x+ 1) ≤ BL(x),∀x ≥ T. (136)
Given δ > 0, since V (P) is finite, there exists integer T ∗ > T such that∫
x≥T∗
L(x)P(dx) < δ
B
. (137)
For any integers i ≥ 1, N ≥ T ∗, ∫
x∈[N,N+1)
L(x)Pi(dx) ≤ Pi([N,N + 1))L(N + 1) (138)
= P([N,N + 1))L(N + 1) (139)
≤
∫
x∈[N,N+1)
BL(x)P(dx). (140)
Therefore, ∫
x∈[T∗,+∞)
L(x)Pi(dx) ≤
∫
x∈[T∗,+∞)
BL(x)P(dx) (141)
≤ B δ
B
(142)
= δ. (143)
For x ∈ [0, T ∗), L(x) is a bounded function, and thus by the definition of Riemann-Stieltjes integral, we have
lim
i→∞
∫
x∈[0,T∗)
L(x)Pi(dx) =
∫
x∈[0,T∗)
L(x)P(dx). (144)
So there exists a sufficiently large integer i∗ such that for all i ≥ i∗∣∣∣∣∣
∫
x∈[0,T∗)
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
x∈[0,T∗)
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ. (145)
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Hence, for all i ≥ i∗
|V (Pi)− V (P)| (146)
=
∣∣∣∣∫
x∈R
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣ (147)
= 2
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
x∈[0,T∗)
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
x∈[0,T∗)
L(x)P(dx) +
∫
x∈[T∗,+∞)
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
x∈[T∗,+∞)
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣∣ (148)
≤ 2
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
x∈[0,T∗)
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
x∈[0,T∗)
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣∣+ 2
∫
x∈[T∗,+∞)
L(x)Pi(dx) + 2
∫
x∈[T∗,+∞)
L(x)P(dx) (149)
≤ 2(δ + δ + δ
B
) (150)
≤ (4 + 2
B
)δ. (151)
Therefore,
lim
i→+∞
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pi(dx) =
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (152)
Define SPi,sym , {Pi|P ∈ SP sym} for i ≥ 1, i.e., SPi,sym is the set of probability distributions satisfying differential
privacy constraint (33) and having symmetric piecewise constant (over intervals [k∆i , (k + 1)
∆
i ) ∀k ∈ N ) probability density
functions.
Due to Lemma 19,
Lemma 20.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,sym
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (153)
Therefore, to characterize V ∗, we only need to study probability distributions with symmetric and piecewise constant
probability density functions.
E. Step 4
Next we show that indeed we only need to consider those probability distributions with symmetric piecewise constant
probability density functions which are monotonically decreasing when x ≥ 0.
Lemma 21. Given Pa ∈ SPi,sym with symmetric piecewise constant probability density function f(·), let {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }
be the density sequence of f(·), i.e,
f(x) = ak, x ∈ [k∆
i
, (k + 1)
∆
i
) ∀k ∈ N. (154)
Then we can construct a new probability distribution Pb ∈ SPi,sym the probability density function of which is monotonically
decreasing when x ≥ 0, and ∫
x∈R
L(x)Pb(dx) ≤
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pa(dx). (155)
Proof: Since ak > 0,∀k ∈ N, and
+∞∑
k=0
ak
∆
i
=
1
2
, (156)
we have limk→+∞ ak = 0.
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Given the density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }, construct a new monotonically decreasing density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . }
and a bijective mapping pi : N→ N as follows
I0 = arg max
k∈N
ak, (157)
pi(0) = min
n∈I0
n, i.e., the smallest element in I0, (158)
b0 = api(0), (159)
(160)
∀m ∈ N and m ≥ 1, (161)
Im = arg max
k∈N\{pi(j)|j<m}
ak, (162)
pi(m) = min
n∈Im
n, i.e., the smallest element in Im, (163)
bm = api(m). (164)
Since the sequence {ak} converges to 0, the maximum of {ak} always exists in (157) and (162). Therefore, Im is well
defined for all m ∈ N.
Note that since
∑∞
k=0 ak
∆
i =
1
2 and the sequence {bk}k∈N is simply a permutation of {ak}k∈N,
∑∞
k=1 bk
∆
i =
1
2 .
Therefore, if we define a function g(·) as
g(x) =
{
bk x ∈ [kDi , (k + 1)Di ) for k ∈ N
g(−x) x < 0 (165)
then g(·) is a valid symmetric probability density function, and∫
x∈R
L(x)g(x)dx ≤
∫
x∈R
L(x)f(x)dx. (166)
Next, we prove that the probability distribution Pb with probability density function g(·) satisfies the differential privacy
constraint (33). Since {bk}k∈N is a monotonically decreasing sequence, it is sufficient and necessary to prove that for all k ∈ N,
bk
bk+i
≤ e. (167)
To simplify notation, given k, we define
a∗(k) = min
k≤j≤k+i
ak, (168)
i.e., a∗(k) denotes the smallest number of {ak, ak+1, . . . , ak+i}.
First, when k = 0, it is easy to prove that b0bi ≤ e. Indeed, recall that b0 = api(0) and consider the i+1 consecutive numbers{api(0), api(0)+1, . . . , api(0)+i} in the original sequence {ak}k∈N. Then a∗(0) ≤ bi, since bi is the (i + 1)th largest number in
the sequence {ak}k∈N. Therefore,
b0
bi
=
api(0)
bi
≤ api(0)
a∗(0)
≤ e. (169)
For k = 1, b1 = api(1) and consider the i+ 1 consecutive numbers {api(1), api(1)+1, . . . , api(1)+i}. If pi(0) /∈ [pi(1), pi(1) + i],
then a∗(pi(1)) ≤ bi+1, and thus
b1
bi+1
=
api(1)
b1+i
≤ api(1)
a∗(pi(1))
≤ e. (170)
If pi(0) ∈ [pi(1), pi(1) + i], then a∗(pi(0)) ≤ bi+1 and api(0)a∗(pi(0)) ≤ e. Therefore,
b1
bi+1
≤ b0
b1+i
≤ b0
a∗(pi(0))
≤ e. (171)
Hence, bkbk+i ≤ e holds for k = 1.
In general, given k, we prove bkbk+i ≤ e as follows. First, if pij /∈ [pi(k), pi(k) + i],∀j < k, then a∗pi(k) ≤ bk+i, and hence
bk
bi+k
=
api(k)
bi+k
≤ api(k)
a∗(pi(k))
≤ e. (172)
If there exists j < k and pij ∈ [pi(k) + 1, pi(k) + i], we use Algorithm 2 to compute a number j∗ such that j∗ < k and
pij /∈ [pi(j∗) + 1, pi(j∗) + i],∀j < k.
22
Algorithm 2
j∗ ← k
while there exists some j < k and pij ∈ [pi(j∗) + 1, pi(j∗) + i] do
j∗ ← j
end while
Output j∗
It is easy to show that the loop in Algorithm 2 will terminate after at most k steps.
After finding j∗, we have j∗ < k, and a∗(pi(j∗)) ≤ bk+i. Therefore
bk
bi+k
≤ api(j∗)
bi+k
≤ api(j∗)
a∗(pi(j∗))
≤ e. (173)
So bkbk+i ≤ e holds for all k ∈ N. Therefore, Pb ∈ SPi,sym.
This completes the proof of Lemma 21.
Therefore, if we define
SPi,md , {P|P ∈ SPi,sym, and the density sequence of P is monotonically decreasing}, (174)
then due to Lemma 21,
Lemma 22.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,md
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (175)
F. Step 5
Next we show that among all symmetric piecewise constant probability density functions, we only need to consider those
which are periodically decaying.
More precisely, given positive integer i,
SPi,pd , {P|P ∈ SPi,md, and P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , } satisfying ak
ak+i
= e,∀k ∈ N}, (176)
then
Lemma 23.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,pd
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (177)
Proof: Due to Lemma 22, we only need to consider probability distributions with symmetric and piecewise constant
probability density functions which are monotonically decreasing for x ≥ 0.
We first show that given Pa ∈ SPi,md with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , }, if a0ai < e, then we can construct a
probability distributions Pb ∈ SPi,md with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . , } such that b0bi = e and
V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb). (178)
Define a new sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } by scaling up a0 and scaling down {a1, a2, . . . }. More precisely, let δ =
i
2D(( i2D−a0)e−
a0
ai
+a0)
− 1 > 0, and set
b0 = a0(1 + δ), (179)
bk = ak(1− δ′),∀ k ≥ 1, (180)
where δ′ , a0δi
2D−a0
> 0, and we have chosen δ such that b0bi =
a0
ak
i
2D−a0
i
2D(1+δ)
−a0 = e
.
It is easy to see the sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . , } correspond to a valid probability density function and it also satisfies
the differential privacy constraint (33), i.e.,
bk
bk+i
≤ e,∀k ≥ 0. (181)
Let Pb be the probability distribution with {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . , } as the density sequence of its probability density function.
Next we show V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
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It is easy to compute V (Pa), which is
V (Pa) = 2∆
i
(
a0
∫ ∆
i
0
L(x)dx+
∞∑
k=1
ak
∫ (k+1) ∆i
k∆i
L(x)dx
)
. (182)
Similarly, we can compute V (Pb) by
V (Pb) = 2∆
i
(
b0
∫ ∆
i
0
L(x)dx+
∞∑
k=1
bk
∫ (k+1) ∆i
k∆i
L(x)dx
)
(183)
= V (Pa) + 2∆
i
(
a0δ
∫ D
i
0
L(x)dx− δ′
∞∑
k=1
ak
∫ (k+1)Di
kDi
L(x)dx
)
(184)
= V (Pa) + 2∆
i
a0δ
i
2∆ − a0
( ∞∑
k=1
ak
∫ ∆
i
0
L(x)dx−
∞∑
k=1
ak
∫ (k+1) ∆i
k∆i
L(x)dx
)
(185)
= V (Pa) + 2∆
i
a0δ
i
2∆ − a0
∞∑
k=1
ak
(∫ ∆
i
0
L(x)dx−
∫ (k+1) ∆i
k∆i
L(x)dx
)
(186)
≤ V (Pa), (187)
where in the last step we used the fact that
(∫ ∆
i
0
L(x)dx− ∫ (k+1) ∆i
k∆i
L(x)dx
)
≤ 0, since L(·) is a monotonically increasing
function for x ≥ 0.
Therefore, for given i ∈ N, we only need to consider P ∈ SPi,md with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying
a0
ai
= e.
Next, we argue that among all probability distributions P ∈ SPi,md with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , } satisfying
a0
ai
= e, we only need to consider those probability distributions with density sequence also satisfying a1ai+1 = e
.
Given Pa ∈ SPi,md with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai = e and a1ai+1 < e, we can construct a new
probability distribution Pb ∈ SPi,md with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } satisfying
b0
bi
= e, (188)
b1
bi+1
= e, (189)
and V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb).
First, it is easy to see a1 is strictly less than a0, since if a0 = a1, then a1ai+1 =
a0
ai+1
≥ a0ai = e. Then we construct a new
density sequence by increasing a1 and decreasing ai+1. More precisely, we define a new sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } as
bk = ak,∀k 6= 1, k 6= i+ 1, (190)
b1 = a1 + δ, (191)
bi+1 = ai+1 − δ, (192)
where δ = e
ai+1−a1
1+e and thus
b1
bi+1
= e.
It is easy to verify that {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } is a valid probability density sequence and the corresponding probability
distribution Pb satisfies the differential privacy constraint (33). Moreover, V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb). Therefore, we only need to
consider P ∈ SPi,md with density sequences {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai = e and a1ai+1 = e.
Use the same argument, we can show that we only need to consider P ∈ SPi,md with density sequences {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }
satisfying
ak
ai+k
= e,∀k ≥ 0. (193)
Therefore,
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,pd
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (194)
Due to Lemma 23, we only need to consider probability distribution with symmetric, monotonically decreasing (for x ≥
0), and periodically decaying piecewise constant probability density function. Because of the properties of symmetry and
periodically decaying, for this class of probability distributions, the probability density function over R is completely determined
by the probability density function over the interval [0,∆).
Next, we study what the optimal probability density function should be over the interval [0,∆). It turns out that the optimal
probability density function over the interval [0,∆) is a step function. We use the following three steps to prove this result.
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G. Step 6
Lemma 24. Consider a probability distribution Pa ∈ SPi,pd (i ≥ 2) with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }, and a0ai−1 <
e. Then there exists a probability distribution Pb ∈ SPi,pd with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . }such that b0bi−1 = e, and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa). (195)
Proof:
For each 0 ≤ k ≤ (i− 1), define
wk ,
+∞∑
j=0
e−j
∫ (j+ k+1i )∆
(j+ ki )∆
L(x)dx. (196)
Since L(cdot) satisfies Property 2 and V ∗ <∞, it is easy to show that the sum of series in (196) exists and is finite, and
thus wk is well defined for all 0 ≤ k ≤ (i− 1). In addition, it is easy to see
w0 ≤ w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wi−1, (197)
since L(x) is a monotonically increasing function when x ≥ 0.
Then
V (Pa) =
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pa(dx) = 2
i−1∑
k=0
wkak. (198)
Since a0ai−1 < e
, we can scale a0 up and scale {a1, . . . , ai−1} down to derive a new valid probability density function with
smaller cost. More precisely, define a new probability measure Pb ∈ SPi,pd with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } via
b0 , γa0, (199)
bk , γ′ak,∀1 ≤ k ≤ i− 1, (200)
for some γ > 1 and γ′ < 1 such that
b0
bi−1
= e. (201)
To make {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } be a valid density sequence, i.e., to make the integral of the corresponding probability density
function over R be 1, we have
i−1∑
k=0
bk =
i−1∑
k=0
ak =
1− e−
2
i
∆
. (202)
Define t , 1−e−2
i
∆ , then we have two linear equations on γ and γ
′:
γa0 = e
γ′ (203)
γa0 + γ
′(t− a0) = t. (204)
From (203) and (204), we can easily get
γ =
etai−1
a0(t− a0 + eai−1) > 1 (205)
γ′ =
t
t− a0 + eai−1 < 1. (206)
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Then we can verify that the V (Pa) ≥ V (Pa). Indeed,
V (Pa)− V (Pb) (207)
=
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pa(dx)−
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pb(dx) (208)
= 2
i−1∑
k=0
wkak − 2
i−1∑
k=0
wkbk (209)
= 2
(
(1− γ)w0a0 + (1− γ′)
i−1∑
k=1
wkak
)
(210)
≥ 2
(
(1− γ)w0a0 + (1− γ′)
i−1∑
k=1
w0ak
)
(211)
= 2 ((1− γ)w0a0 + (1− γ′)w0(t− a0)) (212)
= 2w0
(
a0 − ai−1e
t
t− a0 + eai−1 + (t− a0)
−a0 + eai−1
t− a0 + eai−1
)
(213)
= 0. (214)
This completes the proof.
Therefore, due to Lemma 24, for all i ≥ 2, we only need to consider probability distributions P ∈ SPi,pd with density
sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai−1 = e.
More precisely, define
SPi,fr = {P ∈ SPi,pd|P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0
ai−1
= e}. (215)
Then due to Lemma 24,
Lemma 25.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=3SPi,fr
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (216)
H. Step 7
Next, we argue that for each probability distribution P ∈ SPi,fr (i ≥ 3) with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }, we can
assume that there exists an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2), such that
aj = a0,∀0 ≤ j < k, (217)
aj = ai−1,∀k < j < i. (218)
More precisely,
Lemma 26. Consider a probability distribution Pa ∈ SPi,fr (i ≥ 3) with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }. Then there
exists a probability distribution Pb ∈ SPi,fr with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } such that there exists an integer
1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2) with
bj = a0,∀ 0 ≤ j < k, (219)
bj = ai−1,∀ k < j < i, (220)
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa). (221)
Proof: If there exists integer 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2) such that
aj = a0,∀ 0 ≤ j < k, (222)
aj = ai−1,∀ k < j < i, (223)
then we can set Pb = Pa.
Otherwise, let k1 be the smallest integer in {0, 1, 2, . . . , i− 1} such that
ak1 6= a0, (224)
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and let k2 be the biggest integer in {0, 1, 2, . . . , i− 1} such that
ak2 6= ai−1. (225)
It is easy to see that k1 6= k2. Then we can increase ak1 and decrease ak2 simultaneously by the same amount to derive a
new probability distribution Pb ∈ SPi,fr with smaller cost. Indeed, if
a0 − ak1 ≤ ak2 − ai−1, (226)
then consider a probability distribution Pb ∈ SPi,fr with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bi−1, . . . } defined as
bj = a0,∀0 ≤ j ≤ k1, (227)
bj = aj ,∀k1 < j ≤ k2 − 1, (228)
bk2 = ak2 − (a0 − ak1), (229)
bj = aj ,∀k2 < j ≤ i− 1. (230)
We can verify that V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb) via
V (Pa)− V (Pb) (231)
=
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pa(dx)−
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pb(dx) (232)
= 2(wk1bk1 + wk2bk2)− 2(wk1ak1 + wk2ak2) (233)
= 2wk1(a0 − ak1) + 2wk2(ak2 − (a0 − ak1)− ak2) (234)
= 2(a0 − ak1)(wk1 − wk2) (235)
≤ 0, (236)
where wi is defined in (196).
If a0 − ak1 ≥ ak2 − ai−1, then accordingly we can construct Pb ∈ SPi,fr by setting
bj = a0,∀0 ≤ j < k1, (237)
bk1 = ak1 + (ak2 − ai−1), (238)
bj = aj ,∀k1 < j ≤ k2 − 1, (239)
bj = ai−1,∀k2 ≤ j ≤ i− 1. (240)
And similarly, it is easy to verify that V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb).
Therefore, continue in this way, and finally we will obtain a probability distribution Pb ∈ SPi,fr with density sequence
{b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } such that (219), (220) and (221) hold.
This completes the proof.
Define
SPi,step = {P ∈ SPi,fr | P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying(219) and (220) for some 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2)}.
(241)
Then due to Lemma 26,
Lemma 27.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=3SPi,step
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (242)
I. Step 8
Proof of Theorem 3: Since {Pγ |γ ∈ [0, 1]} ⊆ SP , we have
V ∗ = inf
P∈SP
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) ≤ inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ(dx). (243)
We prove the reverse direction in the following.
We first prove that for any P ∈ SPi,step ( i ≥ 3), there exists γ ∈ [0, 1] such that∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ(dx) ≤
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx). (244)
27
Consider the density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } of P . Since P ∈ SPi,step, there exists an integer 0 ≤ k ≤ i − 2 such
that
aj = a0,∀0 ≤ j < k, (245)
aj = a0e
−,∀k < j ≤ i− 1. (246)
Let
γ′ ,
1−e−
2∆ − a0e−
a0(1− e−) ∈ [0, 1]. (247)
Then a(γ′) = a0.
It is easy to verify that
k
∆
i
≤ γ′∆ ≤ (k + 1)∆
i
. (248)
The probability density functions of P and Pγ′ are the same when x ∈ [0, ki∆)∪[k+1i ∆,∆). Since the integral of probability
density functions over [0,∆) is 1−e
−
2 due to the periodically decaying property, we have
ak
∆
i
= a0(γ
′ − k
i
)∆ + e−a0(
k + 1
i
− γ′)∆. (249)
Define β , i(γ′ − ki ) ∈ [0, 1]. Then
ak = βa0 + (1− β)e−a0. (250)
Define
w
(1)
k ,
+∞∑
j=0
e−j
∫ (j+γ′)∆
(j+ ki )∆
L(x)dx, (251)
w
(2)
k ,
+∞∑
j=0
e−j
∫ (j+ k+1i )∆
(j+γ′)∆
L(x)dx, . (252)
Note that wk = w
(1)
k + w
(2)
k . Since L(x) is a monotonically increasing function when x ≥ 0, we have
w
(2)
k
w
(1)
k
≥ (j +
k+1
i )∆− (j + γ′)∆
(j + γ′)∆− (j + ki )∆
=
k+1
i − γ′
γ′ − ki
. (253)
Therefore, ∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx)−
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ′(dx) (254)
=2wkak − 2
(
w
(1)
k a0 + w
(2)
k a0e
−
)
(255)
=2
(
w
(1)
k + w
(2)
k
)
ak − 2
(
w
(1)
k a0 + w
(2)
k a0e
−
)
(256)
=2(ak − a0e−)w(2)k − 2(a0 − ak)w(1)k . (257)
Since
ak − a0e−
a0 − ak =
β(a0 − a0e−)
(1− β)(a0 − a0e−) (258)
=
β
1− β (259)
=
γ′ − ki
k+1
i − γ′
(260)
≥ w
(1)
k
w
(2)
k
, (261)
28
we have ∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx)−
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ′(dx) (262)
=2(ak − a0e−)w(2)k − 2(a0 − ak)w(1)k (263)
≥0. (264)
Therefore,
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=3SPi,step
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) (265)
≥ inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ(dx). (266)
We conclude
V ∗ = inf
P∈SP
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ(dx) = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)fγ(x)dx. (267)
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof of Theorem 4:
Recall b , e−, and L(x) = |x|. We can compute V (Pγ) via
V (Pγ) =
∫
x∈R
|x|fγ(x)dx (268)
= 2
∫ +∞
0
xfγ(x)dx (269)
= 2
+∞∑
k=0
(∫ γ∆
0
(x+ k∆)a(γ)e−kdx+
∫ ∆
γ∆
(x+ k∆)a(γ)e−e−kdx
)
(270)
= 2∆2a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
e−k
(k + γ)2 − k2
2
+ e−(k+1)
(k + 1)2 − (k + γ)2
2
)
(271)
= 2∆2a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
e−k
γ2 + 2kγ
2
+ e−(k+1)
2k + 1− 2kγ − γ2
2
)
(272)
= 2∆2a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
(b+ (1− b)γ)ke−k + b+ (1− b)γ
2
2
e−k
)
(273)
= 2∆2a(γ)
(
(b+ (1− b)γ) b
(1− b)2 +
b+ (1− b)γ2
2
1
1− b
)
(274)
= 2∆2
1− b
2∆(b+ (1− b)γ)
(
(b+ (1− b)γ) b
(1− b)2 +
b+ (1− b)γ2
2
1
1− b
)
(275)
= ∆
(
b
1− b +
1
2
b+ (1− b)γ2
b+ (1− b)γ
)
, (276)
where in (274) we use the formulas
+∞∑
k=1
bk =
1
1− b , (277)
+∞∑
k=1
kbk =
b
(1− b)2 . (278)
Note that the first term b1−b is independent of γ. Define
g(γ) , b+ (1− b)γ
2
b+ (1− b)γ , (279)
and thus to minimize V (Pγ) over γ ∈ [0, 1], we only need to minimize g(γ) over γ ∈ [0, 1].
29
Since γ ∈ [0, 1], g(γ) ≤ 1. Also note that g(0) = g(1) = 1. So the optimal γ∗ which minimize g(γ) lies in (0, 1).
Compute the derivative of g(γ) via
g′(γ) =
2γ(1− b)(b+ (1− b)γ)− (b+ (1− b)γ2)(1− b)
(b+ (1− b)γ)2 (280)
= (1− b) (1− b)γ
2 + 2bγ − b
(b+ (1− b)γ)2 . (281)
Set g′(γ∗) = 0 and we get
γ∗ =
√
b− b
1− b (282)
=
e−
1
2  − e−
1− e− (283)
=
1
1 + e

2
. (284)
Therefore,
V (Pγ∗) = ∆
(
b
1− b +
1
2
b+ (1− b)γ∗2
b+ (1− b)γ∗
)
(285)
= ∆
e

2
e − 1 . (286)
Due to Theorem 3, the minimum expectation of noise amplitude is V (Pγ∗) = ∆ e

2
e−1 .
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Proof of Theorem 6:
Recall b , e−. Then we compute V (Pγ) for the cost function L(x) = x2 via
V (Pγ) =
∫
x∈R
x2fγ(x)dx (287)
= 2
∫ +∞
0
x2fγ(x)dx (288)
= 2
+∞∑
k=0
(∫ γ∆
0
(x+ k∆)2a(γ)e−kdx+
∫ ∆
γ∆
(x+ k∆)2a(γ)e−e−kdx
)
(289)
= 2∆3a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
e−k
(k + γ)3 − k3
3
+ e−(k+1)
(k + 1)3 − (k + γ)3
3
)
(290)
= 2∆3a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
e−k
γ3 + 3kγ2 + 3k2γ
3
+ e−(k+1)
3k2 + 3k + 1− 3k2γ − 3kγ2 − γ3
3
)
(291)
= 2∆3a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
(
1− γ3
3
b+
γ3
3
)e−k + (γ2 + (1− γ2)b)ke−k + (γ + (1− γ)b)k2e−k
)
(292)
= 2∆3a(γ)
(
(
1− γ3
3
b+
γ3
3
)
1
1− b + (γ
2 + (1− γ2)b) b
(1− b)2 + (γ + (1− γ)b)
b2 + b
(1− b)3
)
(293)
= 2∆3
1− b
2∆(b+ (1− b)γ)
(
(
1− γ3
3
b+
γ3
3
)
1
1− b + (γ
2 + (1− γ2)b) b
(1− b)2 + (γ + (1− γ)b)
b2 + b
(1− b)3
)
(294)
= ∆2
(
b2 + b
(1− b)2 +
b+ (1− b)γ2
b+ (1− b)γ
b
1− b +
1
3
b+ (1− b)γ3
b+ (1− b)γ
)
, (295)
where in (293) we use formulas (277), (278) and
+∞∑
k=1
k2bk =
(b2 + b)
(1− b)3 . (296)
30
Note that the first term b
2+b
(1−b)2 is independent of γ. Define
h(γ) , b+ (1− b)γ
2
b+ (1− b)γ
b
1− b +
1
3
b+ (1− b)γ3
b+ (1− b)γ (297)
=
(1−b)γ3
3 + bγ
2 + b
2
1−b +
b
3
b+ (1− b)γ , (298)
and thus to minimize V (Pγ) over γ ∈ [0, 1], we only need to minimize h(γ) over γ ∈ [0, 1].
Since γ ∈ [0, 1], h(γ) ≤ b1−b + 13 . Also note that h(0) = h(1) = b1−b + 13 . So the optimal γ∗ which minimize h(γ) lies in
(0, 1).
Compute the derivative of h(γ) via
h′(γ) =
((1− b)γ2 + 2bγ)(b+ (1− b)γ)− ( 1−b3 γ3 + bγ2 + b
2
1−b +
b
3 )(1− b)
(b+ (1− b)γ)2 (299)
=
2
3 (1− b)2γ3 + 2b(1− b)γ2 + 2b2γ − 2b
2+b
3
(b+ (1− b)γ)2 (300)
. (301)
Set h′(γ∗) = 0 and we get
2
3
(1− b)2γ∗3 + 2b(1− b)γ∗2 + 2b2γ∗ − 2b
2 + b
3
= 0. (302)
Therefore, the optimal γ∗ is the real-valued root of the cubic equation (302), which is
γ∗ = − b
1− b +
(b− 2b2 + 2b4 − b5)1/3
21/3(1− b)2 . (303)
We plot γ∗ as a function of b in Figure 4, and we can see γ∗ → 12 as → 0, and γ∗ → 0 as → +∞. This also holds in
the case L(x) = |x|.
Plug (303) into (295), and we get the minimum noise power
V (Pγ∗) = ∆2
(
b2 + b
(1− b)2 +
b+ (1− b)γ∗2
b+ (1− b)γ∗
b
1− b +
1
3
b+ (1− b)γ∗3
b+ (1− b)γ∗
)
(304)
= ∆2
2−2/3b2/3(1 + b)2/3 + b
(1− b)2 . (305)
Due to Theorem 3, the minimum expectation of noise power is V (Pγ∗) = ∆2 2
−2/3b2/3(1+b)2/3+b
(1−b)2 .
APPENDIX E
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Proof of Theorem 8: Let n = m+ 1, and define
ci ,
+∞∑
k=0
bkki, (306)
for nonnegative integer i.
31
First we compute V (Pγ) via
V (Pγ) = 2
+∞∑
k=0
(∫ γ∆
0
(x+ k∆)ma(γ)e−kdx+
∫ ∆
γ∆
(x+ k∆)ma(γ)e−(k+1)dx
)
(307)
= 2a(γ)∆m+1
+∞∑
k=0
(
bk
(k + γ)m+1 − km+1
m+ 1
+ bk+1
(k + 1)m+1 − (k + γ)m+1
m+ 1
)
(308)
= 2∆na(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
bk
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
γikn−i
n
+ bbk
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
(1− γi)kn−i
n
)
(309)
= 2∆na(γ)
(
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
γicn−i
n
+ b
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(1− γi)cn−i
n
)
(310)
= 2∆na(γ)
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(γi(1− b) + b)
n
(311)
=
2∆n(1− b)
2∆n
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(γi(1− b) + b)
γ(1− b) + b . (312)
Let hi(γ) , γ
i(1−b)+b
γ(1−b)+b for i ≥ 2. Since hi(0) = hi(1) = 1 and hi(γ) < 1 for γ ∈ (0, 1), hi(γ) achieves the minimum value
in the open interval (0, 1).
Therefore, if we define h(γ) ,
∑n
i=1 (
n
i)cn−i(γ
i(1−b)+b)
γ(1−b)+b , the optimal γ
∗ ∈ [0, 1], which minimizes V (Pγ), should satisfy
h′(γ∗) = 0, (313)
where h′(·) denotes the first order derivative of h(·).
It is straightforward to derive the expression for h′(·):
h′(γ) =
(
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iiγi−1(1− b))(γ(1− b) + b)− (1− b)
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(γi(1− b) + b)
(γ(1− b) + b)2 (314)
=
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iiγi(1− b)2 +
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iiγi−1(1− b)b−
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iγi(1− b)2 −
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b)
(γ(1− b) + b)2
(315)
=
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)γi(1− b)2 +
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iiγi−1(1− b)b−
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b)
(γ(1− b) + b)2 . (316)
Therefore, γ∗ should make the numerator of (316) be zero, i.e., γ∗ satisfies
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)γi(1− b)2 +
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iiγi−1(1− b)b−
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b) = 0. (317)
Since
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)γi(1− b)2 +
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iiγi−1(1− b)b−
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b) (318)
=
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)γi(1− b)2 +
n−1∑
i=0
(
n
i+ 1
)
cn−(i+1)(i+ 1)γi(1− b)b−
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b) (319)
=c0(n− 1)γn(1− b)2 +
n−1∑
i=1
((
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)(1− b)2 +
(
n
i+ 1
)
cn−(i+1)(i+ 1)(1− b)b
)
γi
+ ncn−1(1− b)b−
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b) (320)
=c0(n− 1)γn(1− b)2 +
n−1∑
i=1
((
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)(1− b)2 +
(
n
i+ 1
)
cn−(i+1)(i+ 1)(1− b)b
)
γi −
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b),
(321)
32
γ∗ satisfies
c0(n− 1)γ∗n(1− b)2 +
n−1∑
i=1
((
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)(1− b)2 +
(
n
i+ 1
)
cn−(i+1)(i+ 1)(1− b)b
)
γ∗i −
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b) = 0.
(322)
We can derive the asymptotic properties of γ∗ from (322). Before deriving the properties of γ∗, we first study the asymptotic
properties of ci, which are functions of b.
There are closed-form formulas for ci (i=0,1,2,3):
c0 =
+∞∑
k=0
bk =
1
1− b , (323)
c1 =
+∞∑
k=0
bkk =
b
(1− b)2 , (324)
c2 =
+∞∑
k=0
bkk2 =
b2 + b
(1− b)3 , (325)
c3 =
+∞∑
k=0
bkk3 =
b3 + 4b2 + b
(1− b)4 . (326)
(327)
In general, for i ≥ 1,
ci+1 =
+∞∑
k=0
bkki+1 =
+∞∑
k=1
bkki+1 = b+
+∞∑
k=1
bk+1(k + 1)i+1, (328)
bci+1 =
+∞∑
k=0
bk+1ki+1 =
+∞∑
k=1
bk+1ki+1. (329)
Therefore,
ci+1 − bci+1 = b+
+∞∑
k=1
bk+1((k + 1)i+1 − ki+1) (330)
= b+
+∞∑
k=1
bk+1
i∑
j=0
(
i+ 1
j
)
kj (331)
= b+ b
i∑
j=0
(
i+ 1
j
) +∞∑
k=1
kjbk (332)
= b+ b(
b
1− b +
i∑
j=1
(
i+ 1
j
)
cj) (333)
=
b
1− b + b
i∑
j=1
(
i+ 1
j
)
cj , (334)
and thus
ci+1 =
b
(1− b)2 +
b
1− b
i∑
j=1
(
i+ 1
j
)
cj . (335)
From (335), by induction we can easily prove that
• as b→ 0, ci → 0,∀i ≥ 1;
• as b→ 1, ∀i ≥ 0, ci → +∞, ci = Ω( i!(1−b)i+1 ) and
lim
b→1
ci+1
ci
(1− b) = i+ 1. (336)
As b→ 0, since ci → 0 for i ≥ 1 and c0 = 1, the last two terms of (322) go to zero, and thus from (322) we can see that
γ∗ goes to zero as well.
33
As b→ 1, since ci = Ω( 1(1−b)i+1 ) and γ∗ is bounded by 1, the first term of (322) goes to zero, and the dominated terms in
(322) are (
n
2
)
cn−22(1− b)bγ∗ −
(
n
2
)
cn−2b(1− b) = 0. (337)
Thus, in the limit we have γ∗ = 12 . Therefore, as b→ 1, γ∗ → 12 .
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 11 AND THEOREM 12
In this section, we prove Theorem 11 and Theorem 12, which give the optimal noise-adding mechanisms in the discrete
setting.
A. Outline of Proof
The proof technique is very similar to the proof in the continuous settings in Appendix B. The proof consists of 5 steps in
total, and in each step we narrow down the set of probability distributions where the optimal probability distribution should
lie in:
• Step 1 proves that we only need to consider probability mass functions which are monotonically increasing for i ≤ 0 and
monotonically decreasing for i ≥ 0.
• Step 2 proves that we only need to consider symmetric probability mass functions.
• Step 3 proves that we only need to consider symmetric probability mass functions which have periodic and geometric
decay for i ≥ 0, and this proves Theorem 11.
• Step 4 and Step 5 prove that the optimal probability mass function over the interval [0,∆) is a discrete step function, and
they conclude the proof of Theorem 12.
B. Step 1
Recall SP denotes the set of all probability mass functions which satisfy the -differential privacy constraint (76). Define
V ∗ , inf
P∈SP
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i). (338)
First we prove that we only need to consider probability mass functions which are monotonically increasing for i ≤ 0 and
monotonically decreasing for i ≥ 0.
Define
SPmono , {P ∈ SP|P(i) ≤ P(j),P(m) ≥ P(n),∀i ≤ j ≤ 0, 0 ≤ m ≤ n}. (339)
Lemma 28.
V ∗ = inf
P∈SPmono
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i). (340)
Proof: We will prove that given a probability mass function Pa ∈ SP , we can construct a new probability mass function
Pb ∈ SPmono such that
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pa(i) ≥
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pb(i). (341)
Given Pa ∈ SP , consider the sequence sa = {Pa(0),Pa(1),Pa(−1),Pa(2),Pa(−2), . . . }. Use the same argument in
Lemma 18 and we can show Pa(i) > 0,∀ i ∈ Z. Let the sequence sb = {b0, b1, b−1, b2, b−2, . . . } be a permutation of the
sequence sa in descending order. Since
∑+∞
i=−∞ Pa(i) = 1, limi→−∞ Pa(i) = limi→+∞ Pa(i) = 0, and thus sb is well
defined. Let pi be the corresponding permutation mapping, i.e., pi : Z→ Z, and
bi = Pa(pi(i)). (342)
Since L(·) is a symmetric function and monotonically decreasing for i ≥ 0, we have
L(0) ≤ L(1) ≤ L(−1) ≤ L(2) ≤ L(−2) ≤ · · · ≤ L(i) ≤ L(−i) ≤ L(i+ 1) ≤ L(−(i+ 1)) ≤ · · · . (343)
34
Therefore, if we define a probability mass function Pb with
Pb(i) = bi,∀i ∈ Z, (344)
then
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pa(i) ≥
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pb(i). (345)
Next, we only need to prove Pb ∈ SPmono, i.e., we need to show that Pb satisfies the differential privacy constraint (76).
Due to the way how we construct the sequence sb, we have
b0 ≥ b1 ≥ b2 ≥ b3 ≥ · · · , (346)
b0 ≥ b−1 ≥ b−2 ≥ b−3 ≥ · · · . (347)
Therefore, it is both sufficient and necessary to prove that
bi
bi+∆
≤ e,∀i ≥ 0, (348)
bi
bi−∆
≤ e,∀i ≤ 0. (349)
Since Pa ∈ SP , ∀ i ∈ {pi(0)−∆, pi(0)−∆ + 1, pi(0)−∆ + 2, . . . , pi(0) + ∆},
Pa(pi(0))
Pa(i) ≤ e
. (350)
Therefore, in the sequence sb there exist at least 2∆ elements which are no smaller than b0e−. Since b−∆ and b∆ are the
2∆th and (2∆− 1)th largest elements in the sequence sb other than b0, we have b0b−∆ ≤ e and b0b∆ ≤ e.
In general, given i ∈ Z, we can use Algorithm 3 to find at least 2∆ elements in the sequence sb which are no bigger than
bi and no smaller than bie−.
More precisely, given i ∈ Z, let j∗R and j∗L be the output of Algorithm 3. Note that since the while loops in Algorithm 3 can
take only at most 2(|i|+ 1) steps, the algorithm will always terminate. For all integers j ∈ [pi(j∗L)−∆, pi(j∗L)− 1], Pa(j) is
no bigger than bi and is no smaller than Pa(j∗L)e−; and for all integers j ∈ [pi(j∗R) + 1, pi(j∗R) + ∆], Pa(j) is no bigger than
bi and is no smaller than Pa(j∗R)e−. Since Pa(j∗R),Pa(j∗L) ≥ bi, for all j ∈ [pi(j∗L)−∆, pi(j∗L)− 1]∪ [pi(j∗R) + 1, pi(j∗R) + ∆],
Pa(j) is no bigger than bi and is no smaller than bie−. Therefore, there exist at least 2∆ elements in the sequence sb which
are no bigger than bi and no smaller than bie−.
If i ≤ 0, then bi−∆ is the 2∆th largest element in the sequence sb which is no bigger than bi and no smaller than bie−;
and if i ≥ 0, then bi+∆ is the (2∆− 1)th largest element in the sequence sb which is no bigger than bi and no smaller than
bie
−. Therefore, we have
bi
bi+∆
≤ e,∀i ≥ 0, (351)
bi
bi−∆
≤ e,∀i ≤ 0. (352)
This completes the proof of Lemma 28.
Algorithm 3
j∗R ← i
while there exists some j which appears before i in the sequence {0, 1,−1, 2,−2, . . . } and pi(j) ∈ [pi(j∗R) + 1, pi(j∗R) + ∆]
do
j∗R ← j
end while
j∗L ← i
while there exists some j which appears before i in the sequence {0, 1,−1, 2,−2, . . . } and pi(j) ∈ [pi(j∗L)−∆, pi(j∗L)− 1]
do
j∗L ← j
end while
Output j∗R and j
∗
L.
35
C. Step 2
Next we prove that we only need to consider symmetric probability mass functions which are monotonically decreasing
when i ≥ 0.
Define
SP sym , {P ∈ SPmono| P(i) = P(−i),∀ i ∈ Z}. (353)
Lemma 29.
V ∗ = inf
P∈SP sym
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i). (354)
Proof: The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 16.
Given Pa ∈ SPmono, define a new probability mass function Pb with
Pb(i) , Pa(i) + Pa(−i)
2
,∀i ∈ Z. (355)
It is easy to see Pb is a valid probability mass function and symmetric. Since the cost function L(·) is symmetric,
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pa(i) =
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pb(i). (356)
Next we show that Pb also satisfies the differential privacy constraint (76). For any i ∈ Z and |d| ≤ ∆, since Pa(i) ≤
ePa(i+ d) and Pa(−i) ≤ ePa(−i− d), we have
Pb(i) = Pa(i) + Pa(−i)
2
(357)
≤ e
Pa(i+ d) + ePa(−i− d)
2
(358)
= ePb(i+ d). (359)
Therefore, Pb satisfies (76).
Finally, for any 0 ≤ i ≤ j,
Pb(i) = Pa(i) + Pa(−i)
2
(360)
≥ Pa(j) + Pa(−j)
2
(361)
= Pb(j). (362)
So Pb ∈ SPmono, and thus Pb ∈ SP sym. We conclude
V ∗ = inf
P∈SP sym
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i). (363)
D. Step 3
Next we show that among all symmetric and monotonically decreasing (for i ≥ 0) probability mass function, we only need
to consider those which are periodically and geometrically decaying.
More precisely, define
SPpd , {P ∈ SP sym| P(i)P(i+ ∆) = e
,∀ i ∈ N}. (364)
Then
Lemma 30.
V ∗ = inf
P∈SPpd
V (P). (365)
Proof: Due to Lemma 29, we only need to consider probability mass functions which are symmetric and monotonically
decreasing for i ≥ 0.
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We first show that given Pa ∈ SP sym, if Pa0Pa∆ < e, then we can construct a probability mass function Pb ∈ SP sym such
that Pb0Pb∆ = e
 and
V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb). (366)
Since Pa is symmetric,
V (Pa) = L(0)Pa(0) + 2
+∞∑
i=1
L(i)Pa(i). (367)
Suppose Pa0Pa∆ < e
, then define a new symmetric probability mass function Pb with
Pb(0) , (1 + δ)Pa(0), (368)
Pb(i) , (1− δ′)Pa(i),∀i ∈ Z\{0}, (369)
where
δ =
e Pa(∆)Pa(0) − 1
1 + e Pa(∆)1−Pa(0)
> 0, (370)
δ′ =
e Pa(∆)Pa(0) − 1
1
Pa(0) + e
 Pa(∆)
Pa(0) − 1
> 0, (371)
so that Pb(0)Pb(∆) = e
.
It is easy to see Pb ∈ SP sym, and
V (Pb)− V (Pa) (372)
=δL(0)Pa(0)− 2δ′
+∞∑
i=1
L(i)Pa(i) (373)
≤δL(0)Pa(0)− 2δ′
+∞∑
i=1
L(0)Pa(i) (374)
≤δL(0)Pa(0)− δ′L(0)(1− Pa(0)) (375)
=0. (376)
Therefore, we only need to consider P ∈ SP sym satisfying P(0)P(∆) = e.
By using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 23, one can conclude that we only need to consider P ∈ SP sym
satisfying
P(i)
P(i+ ∆) = e
,∀i ∈ N. (377)
Therefore, V ∗ = infP∈SPpd V (P).
Proof of Theorem 11: In the case that ∆ = 1, due to Lemma 30, the symmetry property and (377) completely characterize
the optimal noise probability mass function, which is the geometric mechanism.
E. Step 4
Due to Lemma 30, the optimal probability mass function P is completely characterized by P(0),P(1), . . . ,P(∆− 1). Next
we derive the properties of optimal probability mass function in the domain {0, 1, 2, . . . ,∆− 1}.
Since Lemma 30 solves the case ∆ = 1, in the remaining of this section, we assume ∆ ≥ 2.
Define
SP stepλ , {P ∈ SPpd|∃k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆− 2},P(i) = P(0),∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k},P(j) = λP(0),∀j ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,∆− 1}}.
(378)
Lemma 31.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪λ∈[e−,1]SP stepλ
V (P). (379)
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Proof: If ∆ = 2, then for any P ∈ SPpd, we can set k = 0, and P ∈ SP step P(∆−1)
P(0)
. Therefore, Lemma 31 holds for
∆ = 2.
Assume ∆ ≥ 3. First, we prove that we only need to consider probability mass function P ∈ SPpd such that there exists
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∆− 2} with
P(i) = P(0),∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} (380)
P(j) = P(∆− 1),∀i ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,∆− 1}. (381)
More precisely, let Pa ∈ SPpd, we can construct a probability mass function Pb ∈ SPpd such that there exists k satisfying
(380) and (381), and V (Pb) ≥ V (Pa).
The proof technique is very similar to proof of Lemma 26. Suppose there does not exists such k for Pa, then let k1 be the
smallest integer in {1, 2, . . . ,∆− 1} such that
Pa(k1) 6= Pa(0), (382)
and let k2 be the biggest integer in {0, 1, . . . ,∆− 2} such that
Pa(k2) 6= Pa(∆− 1). (383)
It is easy to see that k1 < k2, and k1 6= 0. Then we can increase Pa(k1) and decrease Pa(k2) simultaneously by the same
amount to derive a new probability mass function Pb ∈ SPpd with smaller cost. Indeed, if
Pa(0)− Pa(k1) ≤ Pa(k2)− Pa(∆− 1), (384)
then consider a probability mass function Pb ∈ SPpd with
Pb(i) = Pa(0),∀0 ≤ i ≤ k1, (385)
Pb(i) = Pa(i),∀k1 < i < k2, (386)
Pb(k2) = Pa(k2)− (Pa(0)− Pa(k1)), (387)
Pb(i) = Pa(i),∀k2 < i ≤ ∆− 1. (388)
Define
w0 , L(0) + 2
∞∑
k=1
L(k∆)e−k, (389)
wi , 2
∞∑
k=0
L(i+ k∆)e−k,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∆− 1}. (390)
Note that since L(·) is a monotonically decreasing function when i ≥ 0, we have w0 ≤ w1 ≤ · · · ≤ w∆−1.
Then we can verify that V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa) via
V (Pb)− V (Pa) (391)
=
∆−1∑
i=0
Pb(i)wi −
∆−1∑
i=0
Pa(i)wi (392)
= (Pa(0)− Pa(k1))(wk1 − wk2) (393)
≤ 0. (394)
If
Pa(0)− Pa(k1) ≥ Pa(k2)− Pa(∆− 1), (395)
then we can define Pb ∈ SPpd by setting
Pb(i) = Pa(0),∀0 ≤ i < k1, (396)
Pb(k1) = Pa(k1) + (Pa(k2)− Pa(∆− 1)), (397)
Pb(i) = Pa(i),∀k1 < i < k2, (398)
Pb(i) = Pa(∆− 1),∀k2 ≤ i ≤ ∆− 1. (399)
And similarly, we have
V (Pb)− V (Pa) = (Pa(k2)− Pa(∆− 1))(wk1 − wk2) ≤ 0. (400)
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Therefore, continue in this way, and finally we will obtain a probability mass function Pb ∈ SPpd such that there exists k
to satisfy (380) and (381) and V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
From the above argument, we can see that in the optimal solution P∗ ∈ SPpd, the probability mass function can only take
at most three distinct values for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆− 1}, which are P∗(0),P∗(k) and P∗(∆− 1). Next we show that indeed
either P∗(k) = P∗(0) and P∗(k) = P∗(∆− 1), and this will complete the proof of Lemma 31.
The optimal probability mass function P ∈ SPpd can be specified by three parameters P(0), λ ∈ [e−, 1], k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∆−
2} and P(k). We will show that when k and λ are fixed, to minimize the cost, we have either P(k) = P(0) or P(k) =
P(∆− 1) = λP(0).
Since
∑+∞
i=−∞ P(i) = 1,
2
kP(0) + P(k) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0) = 1, (401)
and thus P(k) = (1+P(0))(1−b)−2P(0)k−2λP(0)(∆−k−1)2 .
The cost for P is
V (P) = P(0)
k−1∑
i=0
wi + P(∆− 1)
∆−1∑
i=k+1
wi + P(k)wk (402)
= P(0)
k−1∑
i=0
wi + λP(0)
∆−1∑
i=k+1
wi + (
(1 + P(0))(1− b)− 2P(0)k − 2λP(0)(∆− k − 1)
2
)wk, (403)
which is a linear function of the parameter P(0).
Since P(k) ≥ λP(0) and P(k) ≤ P(0), we have
2
kP(0) + P(k) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0) = 1 ≤ 2
kP(0) + P(0) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0), (404)
2
kP(0) + P(k) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0) = 1 ≥ 2
kP(0) + λP(0) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0), (405)
and thus the constraints on P(0) are
1− b
2k + 2 + 2λ(∆− k − 1)− 1 + b ≤ P(0) ≤
1− b
2k + 2λ(∆− k)− 1 + b . (406)
Since V (P) is a linear function of P(0), to minimize the cost V (P), either P(0) = 1−b2k+2+2λ(∆−k−1)−1+b or P(0) =
1−b
2k+2λ(∆−k)−1+b , i.e., P(0) should take one of the two extreme points of (406). To get these two extreme points, we have
either P(k) = P(0) or P(k) = λP(0) = P(∆− 1).
Therefore, in the optimal probability mass function P ∈ SPpd, there exists k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆− 2} such that
P(i) = P(0),∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} (407)
P(i) = P(∆− 1),∀i ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,∆− 1}. (408)
This completes the proof of Lemma 31.
F. Step 5
In the last step, we prove that although λ ∈ [e−, 1], in the optimal probability mass function, λ is either e− or 1, and this
will complete the proof of Theorem 12.
Proof: For fixed k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆− 2}, consider P ∈ SPpd with
P(i) = P(0),∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, (409)
P(i) = λP(0),∀i ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,∆− 1}. (410)
Since
∑+∞
i=−∞ P(i) = 1,
2
(k + 1)P(0) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0) = 1, (411)
and thus
P(0) = 1− b
2(k + 1) + 2(∆− k − 1)λ− 1 + b . (412)
Hence, P is specified by only one parameter λ.
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The cost of P is
V (P) =
∆−1∑
i=0
P(i)wi (413)
= P(0)
k∑
i=0
wi + λP(0)
∆−1∑
k+1
wi (414)
=
(1− b)(∑ki=0 wi + λ∑∆−1i=k+1 wi)
2(k + 1) + 2(∆− k − 1)λ− 1 + b (415)
= (1− b)(C1 + C2
2(k + 1) + 2(∆− k − 1)λ− 1 + b ), (416)
where C1 and C2 are constant terms independent of λ. Therefore, to minimize V (P) over λ ∈ [e−, 1], λ should take the
extreme points, either e− or 1, depending on whether C2 is negative or positive.
When λ = 1, then the probability mass function is uniquely determined, which is P ∈ SPpd with
P(i) = 1− b
2∆− 1 + b ,∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆− 1}, (417)
which is exactly Pr defined in (79) with r = ∆.
When λ = e−, the probability mass function is exactly Pr with r = k + 1.
Therefore, we conclude that
V ∗ = min
{r∈N|1≤r≤∆}
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pr(i). (418)
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